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Projection and Phrase Structure
1. Perfect Syntax
Consider a rather standard system of grammar in which the relationship between meaning and 
sound is mediated by two interpretive systems applying to some interface representation(s) 
generated by syntax.* Suppose that these apply to the same representation, clearly a desirable 
additional assumption. The syntactic computation can be viewed as having then the task of 
composing this interface representation (say the level Lexico-Logical Form (LLF) of Brody 
1995a), from elements provided by the lexicon.
A possible view is to deny the existence of syntax in this sense. One can maintain that 
there is no competence theory internal question as to how LLF structures are put together. 
Under such a view LLF structures are given, by grammar external systems, and the task of 
the grammar would be only to define a subset (the well formed instances) of the structures 
offered by some grammar external component.
Consider the conjunction of such a view with a strong version of the minimalist 
hypothesis according to which syntactic interface conditions reduce to "bare output 
conditions", ie. conditions forced on (L)LF representations by the interpretive systems 
applying to it. The conjunction of this hypothesis with the assumption that the question of 
LLF assembly is grammar external entails that there is no syntax at all that is part of human 
grammatical competence.
Obviously such a "no syntax" view does not resolve the question of how the structures 
that are the input to the interpretive systems are related to individual lexical items (Lis), it 
only shifts this problem into a different component of the mind. The issue of whether syntax 
exists is nevertheless empirical and we might hope to find evidence that bears on this matter. 
The position that syntax, in the sense of LLF assembly, exists as part of competence theory 
will be supported to the extent that such a system can provide explanations of (L)LF 
properties. The theory to be presented in this paper will provide some evidence of this kind.
Suppose that syntax, in the sense just characterized exists. There is then an empirical 
issue as to the nature of this system, which relates Lis creating the LLF representation. 
Optimally, this system should be near trivial: we would hope that apparent complexities are 
due to properties of the interpretive components. We might then expect to find a system that 
is significantly more perfect than the assembly system of the standard minimalist framework. 
Even if the Chain/Move relation is taken to be part of this system, there should be no syntax 
internal conditions on it (like Uniformity, Minimal Chain Link, C-command, Last Resort 
etc.), — cf. Brody 1995b and the discussion of Uniformity below. Furthermore there should 
be no representational-derivational duplications of (near-)identical concepts (eg. Chain and 
Move or the representational definitions of well-formed syntactic objects in addition to actual 
derivations), —cf. Brody 1995a and some discussion in section 5.2 below respectively. Such 
a more restrictive framework eliminates also the possibility of using representational- 
derivational distinctions like deletion (interface invisibility) vs. erasure (invisibility for the 
syntactic computation) that build on such duplications. Additionally we will expect to be able 
to dispense with economy conditions and the serious computational complexity that they 
create. Such requirements simply ensure that apparent imperfections in the assembly system 
follow from syntax-external considerations. Let us call the theory meeting them Perfect 
Syntax. In fact given recent advances in the minimalist framework, the apparently ambitious
* This paper contains a revised version of part of the material in Brody 1994. "Brody 1995b" 
refers to the second paper in this issue in the first and to the first in the second.
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program of Perfect Syntax seems quite reasonable. (See Brody 1995b for a more extended 
discussion of this approach.)
In this paper I shall discuss a system of LLF assembly that could be part of such a 
theory of Perfect Syntax and justify empirically some of its restrictive aspects. I first raise 
some problems in section 2 for the relational (contextual) definitions of projection levels of 
the standard minimalist framework. I provide an alternative system of phrase structure in 
section 3. Section 4 derives basic conditions of this system from a theory of the assembly of 
syntactic structures, providing evidence for the competence theory internal existence of this 
computation. I shall compare certain salient aspects of this theory with the corresponding 
properties of the standard minimalist framework arguing that the theory defended here is not 
only simpler but also more adequate in other ways.
Finally in section 5 I shall turn to the explanation of the Generalized Projection 
Principle, the condition whose major consequence is that selectional requirements and 
categorial projection must hold in the root positions of chains. I shall discuss a non-syntactic 
explanation which I will argue is superior to other recent accounts that give only a partial 
solution and assume the accidental conspiracy of unrelated principles.
2. Problems with Uniformity and the contextual definitions of projection levels
Chomsky 1994, 1995 puts forward the Uniformity condition for chains:
(1) A chain is uniform with regard to phrase structure status
Here the ""phrase structure status" of an element is its (relational) property of maximal, 
minimal or neither". Since intermediate projections are assumed not to be accessible to the 
syntactic computational system, and hence for chain formation, the Uniformity condition in
(1) predicts that only [Xraax,Xmax] and [Xmm, Xmm] chains exist.
The Uniformity condition is necessary to achieve this result only in the context of the 
relational definitions of minimal, maximal and intermediate projections. If the projection level 
of a category is an inherent property, then the independently motivated assumption that chains 
consist of copies trivially entails this result. On the other hand given relational definitions like
(2) it is easy to construct non-uniform chains.
(2) a. a maximal projection (Xmax)is one that does not project 
further
b. minimal projections (Xmin) are the lexical items 
themselves
c. intermediate projections (X’) are elements that are 
neither maximal nor minimal
For example in (3) where an x min forms a chain with a copy that adjoined or substituted to 
an Ymax, Ynot=X, it will form a chain with an Xmax: Here the first X; is an Xmax and the 
second an Xmin:
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(3) Ymax j^max
X:.
Or, if a non chain-root ("moved") x max merges with some category, say Ymax and then X, 
rather than the target of the operation projects further, then it will form a non-uniform chain 
with a nonmaximal projection. In (4) the second Xj is an Xmax, the first is not:
(4) ^max
X; ymax
ymax
I
x i
On usual assumptions the structures in (3) and (4) are ill-formed: minimal projections cannot 
move to (form chains with) positions that are not word-internal (X°-internal in Chomsky’s 
(1995) terminology) and it is always the target of movement that projects (only chain-root 
positions can project). The impossibility of configurations like (3) and (4) has been thought 
of as providing evidence for the relational definitions of projection levels and the uniformity 
condition.
The behavior of clitics has been cited as additional empirical evidence for this system. 
According to the definitions in (2) a category can be both a minimal and a maximal 
projection: a lexical item that does not project further. Clitics appear to transparently 
instantiate this option, since they show properties of both minimal and maximal projections. 
As an Xmin they show up word internally, but they seem to be linked to argument positions 
that are maximal. Furthermore they can often form chains that ignore intervening heads, again 
suggesting (in the context of the head movement constraint) that they are maximal. Thus, 
given the relational definitions in (2), clitics might be treated as both x max and Xmin at the 
same time, accounting for their apparent double nature.
There are a number of problems with the relational definitions (plus Uniformity) 
system that seem to me serious. Let us consider them in turn.
i. Ordinary head movement chains that target word-internal positions are [Xmax, Xmin] 
by the contextual definitions, since the root of the chain is an element that does project further 
while the non-root word-internal member does not. Such chains must be allowed but they 
violate Uniformity. Chomsky (1994, 1995) suggests that there is a special component "WI" 
at LF, where "independent word-interpretation processes" apply. This then ensures that 
word(X°)-internally the principles in (1) and (2) do not apply. WI is " a covert analogue to 
Morphology" (1995, section 7.2, p9). But the reason for the existence of such a covert 
analogue of morphology, and thus the status of WI is unclear. Given the lack of evidence for 
such an additional module the WI hypothesis appears to amount to little more than a statement 
that head-movement targeting a word-internal position is exempt from the uniformity 
requirement. But if so, then we cannot say that Uniformity explains the impossibility of head- 
chains like (3) where a non-root member is word-external. The crucial distinction between 
good and bad cases here is the word-external versus word-internal contrast. Uniformity says 
nothing about this divide, which is simply stipulated.
Note incidentally that in the standard minimalist framework even the status of
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"ordinary" morphology is rather unclear. Morphology must presumably be somewhere on the 
SPELLOUT branch. Since there are only interface conditions in the minimalist grammar, it 
would have to be at the PF level, which does not have the structure necessary for this 
component to operate. (In contrast in the framework of Brody 1993a, 1995a where spellout 
applies to the LF level, morphology can be identical to WI and its principles will hold at this 
level.)
ii. If relational definitions do not apply apply word-internally, then the evidence clitics 
appeared to provide for them disappears. Recall that the evidence was that clitics appear to 
have a different projectional level status word-internally and word-extemally. Since 
grammatical cases of head movement make it necessary to exempt word-internal structure 
from these definitions, the word internal status of clitics becomes irrelevant, and thus cannot 
be used to support the system.
iii. The assumption that the relational definitions do not apply word-internally creates 
further problems. Consider the assumption that word-internal XP-adjunction is excluded in 
Morphology: "The morphological component gives no output (so the derivation crashes) if 
presented with an element that is not an X° or a feature" (Chomsky 1995, section 7.2, p6). 
The question arises how morphology will be able to tell what is an XP inside a word if 
contextual definitions do not apply inside a word. Clearly some other characterization of 
minimal and maximal projection will be necessary. But the resulting system seems quite 
undesirable: why should we need two systems (one relational, one presumably not) to define 
projection levels? Differently put, why do we need contextual definitions of projection levels 
in addition to the apparently independently necessary inherent characterization?
iv. As we have seen above in connection with the structure in (4), Uniformity can be 
used in certain cases to ensure that the target rather than the "moved" (non chain-root) 
category projects. But Uniformity captures here only a small segment of a much larger 
generalization. Firstly it cannot ensure generally that categorial projection is always in the 
root positions of chains. The generalization holds also for X° chains which involve word- 
internal positions. But Uniformity is relevant only for phrasal movement, word-internally 
different principles must apply as we have seen. Furthermore the generalization that 
categorial projection always holds in the root positions of chains is still only one aspect of a 
much larger generalization, the Generalized Projection Principle (GPP). There are a number 
of other "projectional" features that only chain-roots can project: theta roles, and semantic 
selection in general. Since the principle constrains also (quasi-)semantic properties like non- 
grammaticalized selection, it does not appear to be fully reducible to syntax, cf Brody 1995a 
and section 5 below for discussions. If the arguments below against the conspiracy account 
of the GPP are correct, then the fact that Uniformity gives a partial account of one aspect of 
the GPP is not an argument in its favor. If anything it is an argument against Uniformity 
since it seen to be redundant here.
v. An additional curious feature of the relational definitions plus Uniformity theory 
is that according to this system chains but not categories have to be uniform (recall that a 
non-projecting lexical item is both an Xmin and an Xmax). This is of course logically possible: 
a chain-member may be multiply characterized, but all chain-members must have the same 
characterizations. But once we recall that characterization of an element as both minimal and 
maximal does not necessarily lead to contradiction and ungrammaticality, the Uniformity 
assumption seems to loose much of its intuitive appeal.
vi. In my view the most serious objection to the uniformity condition is that one would 
expect a well-designed theory of syntactic computation simply not to make it possible to 
violate this condition: the theory should not provide devices that can violate it. Now without
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relational definitions there can be no Uniformity violations: chains are copies. The copy of 
an Xmax is an Xmax, the copy of an Xmin is an Xmin.
The assumption that chains consist of copies is an independently necessary assumption 
in minimalist frameworks, where representational conditions, like the binding theory can hold 
only at or beyond the interface level of LF. For example in order to rule out the principle 
C violation indicated by the indices in (5), the trace must be (at least a partial) copy at LF 
(and perhaps beyond):
(5) Whosex mother did hex like (whosex mother)
I conclude that the grammar should contain no contextual definitions of projection 
levels. Since chains consist of copies, Uniformity is unnecessary since there are no means to 
violate it, —the optimal situation.
3. A Minimal Theory of Phrase Structure 
3.1. The Principle of Phrasal Projection
Phrases and their heads share properties, like being an N(P) or V(P) etc. It is often assumed 
that the shared properties of the phrase are inherited from the head, syntactic categorial 
structure is projected from the lexicon. Let us express this by saying that phrases are 
projected by their heads. It seems that every phrase must share properties with some head, 
there are no "pure" phrases. If this is true then it is presumably true because phrases can only 
arise through projection:
(6) Principle of Phrasal Projection (PPP)
Every phrase is projected by a lexical item (LI) that it 
dominates
The step from "phrases are projected by Lis" to "all phrases are projected by Lis" seems 
highly natural to me although clearly it is not a necessary one. (Compare this with Kayne’s 
(1995) approach in terms of his Linear Correspondence Axiom (LCA), where there is no 
relation between the fact that phrases have heads and the fact that phrases and their heads 
share features.)
Given Chomsky’s (1995) general condition of Inclusiveness ("the interface levels 
consist of nothing more than arrangements of lexical features") the additional assumption in
(6) seems unavoidable. Let us assume then that phrases are copies of features of lexical items. 
A lexical item is thus an Xmin, a phrase is its partial copy that dominates it. Ignoring 
intermediate projections assume, that all phrases are maximal. For the time being this last 
is only a simplifying assumption, made for the sake of presentation, -but see section 3.2 
below for some discussion. The PPP in (6) seems to provide an optimal theory of syntactic 
structure. But the PPP as a general condition on the well-formedness of phrasal projection 
does not suffice; several additional assumptions appear to be necessary.
First of all it must be ensured that all and only non word-internal heads project a 
phrase, let us call this the extended structure preservation restriction:
(7) Extended structure preservation
a. Every non word-internal head projects some phrase
b. No word-internal head projects a phrase
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As noted in section 2, Chomsky 1995 assumes that (7b) is a morphological condition: 
morphology does not tolerate phrases. Adopting the relational definitions of projection levels, 
he assumes instead of (7a) that a non word-internal head that has not projected is both 
minimal and maximal. Such elements thus can occupy specifier and complement and Xmax- 
adjoined positions, which are reserved for maximal projections. He then rules out a "moved" 
non-root Xmm in such positions using Uniformity. But as we have seen the account of why 
a non-root Xmin cannot appear here is stipulative and there are also a number of other reasons 
for not adopting a theory with the contextual definitions of projection levels. In addition the 
approach in terms of contextual definitions cannot capture the suggestive symmetry of (7).
Secondly the uniqueness of the relation between a phrase and a head also needs to be 
ensured, say as in (8):
(8) Uniqueness
Every phrase is projected by a unique LI
The uniqueness requirement ensures that a phrase cannot be projected by two heads. Thus (8) 
excludes examples like (9).
(9) a. *[x/yp X Y ]
b. *[x/zp Z [xp X ]] 
c- *tx/YP [xp X ] [YP Y ]]
(In the examples in (9) "X/YP" indicates a phrase that both X and Y have projected, ie. a 
phrase that shares properties with both.) Notice here, that Kayne’s LCA predicts this result 
only for the special case when the two heads are both immediately dominated by the phrase, 
as in (9a). The LCA rules out this structure since contrary to its requirement there is no pair 
(C, C’) of constituents related by asymmetric c-command such that C dominates X and C’ 
dominates Y. (According to Kayne’s theory the terminals dominated by X and Y will 
therefore violate the requirement that all terminals need to be ordered by an asymmetric c- 
command relation between categories dominating them.)
The LCA will remain silent, however, about cases where multiple categorial projection 
does not occur in a configuration where more than one head is immediately dominated by the 
offending phrase. For example (9b), a head complement structure (where XP is the 
complement of Z) and (9c), an adjunction configuration (with XP adjoined to YP), are both 
allowed by the LCA. (Z asymmetrically c-commands X in (9b) and XP asymmetrically c- 
commands YP and Y ordering the terminals appropriately, as required by Kayne’s condition.) 
The uniqueness requirement on projection thus does not follow from the LCA, except in the 
special case of (9a).
A third condition, additional to the PPP is necessary to ensure the locality of the 
projection relation:
(10) Locality
if X projects Xmax then there is no category C such that 
Xmax dominates C, C dominates X and C is not a projection 
of X
(10) excludes configurations like (11a). (lib), where the lower YP may be interpreted as an 
intermediate level projection or as a segment of adjunction exemplifies (11a).
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(11) a. [xp [c X]]
b. [XP [YP X [YP Y ]]]
The PPP, requires that every phrase P has a head, namely the one that projected P. 
Together with the uniqueness and locality requirements and the extended structure 
preservation condition in (7), the PPP entails also that every phrase must have a unique head, 
ie. (12):
(12) *X, when X is not maximal and is immediately dominated by
Ymax, unless X = Y
As stated in (12) Xmin cannot be a complement or a specifier of some other projecting head 
Y. An LI Xmin distinct from Ymin cannot be immediately dominated by Ymax, since if Xmin 
is not word-internal then it must project some phrase (Xmax) by (7), and we can show that 
Xmax will intervene between Ymax and Xmin. I shall do this by establishing that the 
assumption that Ymax immediately dominates Xmin leads to a contradiction. We know that 
Xmax dominates Xmin by (4). Furthermore Xraax is distinct from Ymax, the phrase projected 
by Y by (8). But Ymax cannot intervene between Xmax and Xmin, by the locality requirement 
of (10). Hence, Ymax cannot immediately dominate Xmin (it can only immediately dominates 
Xmax that in turn dominates Xmm).
To sum up so far, the PPP expresses the idea that syntactic categorial structure is 
projected from the lexicon. The PPP states that all syntactic categories are related to the 
lexicon: they must either come from the lexicon or be projected by categories which do. That 
a phrase must have a head follows from the PPP, that is from the fact that all phrases are 
projected by their heads. Another assumption is the extended structure preservation 
requirement (7) according to which a precondition for a non word-internal lexical element to 
enter the structure is for it to project (create a phrase). That a phrase must not have more than 
one head will follow the PPP together with the assumptions of uniqueness in (8) and locality 
in (10).
Of course extended structure preservation, like uniqueness and locality are so far only 
stipulated and all three are in need of an explanation. Before going further in trying to 
understand why these conditions on phrase structure should hold (see section 4), I would like 
to make some comments on several concepts that current theories generally assume, but which 
the discussion has so far avoided.
3.2 Some remarks on adjunction and intermediate projections
Notice first of all that the theory of phrase structure in the previous section is neutral with 
respect to the question of binary branching: a condition ensuring this may or may not apply 
in addition to the PPP and related conditions.
Current theories of phrase structure diverge from the simple picture which only 
contains the configuration where a phrase dominates a head and a number of other phrases 
in two major but related respects. An intermediate X’ level is assumed between the head and 
the phrasal node and the configuration of adjunction is allowed in addition. What is the status 
of adjunction and of intermediate projection levels given the theory of section 3.1?
These two configurations can be reduced to one if, as proposed by Kayne (1995), the 
intermediate X’-level is treated as the lower segment of adjunction. It would be quite possible
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to graft a segment-category distinction, and with it a theory of adjunction onto the theory of 
phrase structure as developed so far. But a simpler alternative might be to assume that there 
is no special adjunction configuration. Various arguments have been put forward that 
adjectives and adverbials, which have typically been treated as adjoined elements must in fact 
occupy either the head or the specifier position of some higher projection (Sportiche 1994, 
Cinque 1993, 1995). Under this option, instead of left-adjunction of XP to YP as in (13a), 
we will have the configuration in (13b) with the higher head Z. Z may or may not be 
invisible and/or transparent for selection (selectional requirements may be satisfied here by 
the lower head Y).
(13) a. YP
XP YP
I
Y
b. ZP
XP Z YP
)
Y
As for right-adjunction, this cannot exist in a strictly binary branching theory like that 
of Kayne 1995, where complements of embedded heads correspond to right-adjoined 
elements. As is well known, various tests suggest strongly that right adjoined constituents are 
in fact higher than a general condition like the LCA allows them to be (cf. eg. Williams 
1994, Brody 1994). If structures are not necessarily binary branching, then these problems 
will not arise. Suppose that they are not. A possible alternative treatment of right adjunction 
might be to then take the element A adjoined to constituent B as an additional complement 
of a higher head (rather than of a lower one as in the binary branching account) whose 
preceeding complement is B. Instead of structures like (14a) we will have (14b):
(14) a. YP
YP XP
l
Y
b.
Z YP XP
Y
Like in the case of "left-adjunction", the higher head Z may be invisible and transparent for 
selection.
Consider next the question of intermediate projection levels. As noted one possibility
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is to follow Kayne and treat the intermediate projection as a segment of adjunction. If 
however adjunction does not exist, then a different account is necessary. But the PPP, as it 
stands, allows a word to project more than one phrase. Given the way the locality condition 
is formulated in (10), a phrase does not have to immediately dominate the word that projected 
it, they can be separated by a phrasal node of the same type. Thus the system above allows 
non-maximal projections.
We could define the difference between a maximal and a nonmaximal phrase 
relationally: since nonmaximal phrases are not visible for the computation this will never 
cause the type of problem discussed in connection with relational definitions for all projections 
levels. Given the invisibility of non-maximal phrases, we can assume that no chains can be 
formed which contains such an intermediate projection as a member. Thus no Uniformity 
violation can arise.
Again let us consider briefly an alternative theory. Intermediate projections are not 
visible for the grammar. The best explanation of this fact would be if they did not exist at all. 
Let us suppose that they do not and eliminate the intermediate X’ level. A word can then 
project only a single phrase. The question arises, how specifiers and complements can be 
distinguished. For many cases the checking configuration will provide the answer: the 
specifier is the element that undergoes checking. This will need to be extended to specifiers 
of those projections that instantiate adjunction in the impoverished system tentatively 
suggested above. But the specifiers of lexical categories probably do not participate in a 
checking relation with the lexical head. Here a different solution is necessary.
We can differentiate specifiers and complements of lexical heads without postulating 
either adjunction structures or the existence of categories that are neither word-level nor 
maximal projections by an analysis partly in the spirit of Larson’s (1988) work. Suppose that 
we take a phrase to consist of an internal XP that includes the head and its complements and 
an external XP-shell that contains an empty head and the specifier or specifiers of X as in
(15). The empty head X1 and the lexical head X2 are then taken to form a unit, — a head- 
chain.
(15) XP1
specifier X1 XP  ^
/ '
X2 complement
We could then take the specifier to be that sister of the higher head that does not contain the 
lower head, while the complement(s) would be simply the sister(s) of the lower head. Notice 
that the tree in (15) is only partly Larsonian, since although it involves an higher shell, it is 
not binary branching.
The solution, as it stands, inherits a general problem of Larson’s empty shell 
approach. It is incompatible with the Generalized Projection Principle, which requires that 
categorial projection and the selectional properties of a head must be satisfied in the root 
position of its chain. This problem carries over to the analysis of the phrase in (15). In this 
case the subject is not in the same phrase (XP2) that contains the root position of the head- 
chain. The spec in (15) would therefore have to be selected from the position of X1, not the 
root position X2 of the [X1, X2 ] chain. Furthermore the higher head X1 projects an XP, 
again in spite of not being in the root position of its chain.
One possibility is to assume that the higher head creating the "empty shell" is in fact
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not empty but is itself an abstract lexical element, one that carries the appropriate categorial 
features and selectional requirements of the lexical item whose features are shared between 
a number of head positions (This modification of Larson’s approach is suggested in Brody 
1993a, 1995a, see also Koizumi 1993, and Collins and Thrainsson 1993 and also Chomsky 
1994, 1995 for similar proposals and additional argument.) Multiple argument verbs under 
a Larsonian analysis would all require such a decomposition treatment. Let us apply this 
analysis to the present problem of eliminating the intermediate X’-level in terms of a structure 
like (15). If X is decomposed into X1 and X2 and categories standardly taken as sisters of X’ 
and sisters of X are distinguished as sisters of X1 and sisters of X2 then also simple transitive 
and intransitive heads must decompose into two heads. Eg. the verb see would have to be 
composed of an agent selecting segment and a non-agentive SEE, something like the passive 
was seen.
(In Brody 1994 I raised an apparent problem for this approach to the question of the 
intermediate X’-level: with heads that assign no theta role to their subjects, specifier and 
complements could be distinguished only at the price of postulating a fully empty head. For 
example seem would have to decompose into a higher head that does not select its subject and 
which does not appear to contribute in any other way and a lower one which is exactly like 
seem. The problem arises however only if the expletive subject is generated VP-internally. 
If a verb like seem simply has no VP-internal subject, then there will be no question of how 
such a subject can be distinguished from the complements.)
4 .Assembly of syntactic structures 
4.1 Chain, Project and Insert
The discussion of phrasal projection (in section 3.1 above) has raised several questions. I 
would like to show that a version of the theory of the assembly of syntactic ((L)LF) structures 
proposed in earlier work provides straightforward answers.
This theory postulates three operations: Chain, Project and Insert. Chain forms chains 
by creating copies. (I assume that it may create multiple copies, to allow multi-member 
chains.) Project adds a phrase P to LI and establishes the relation: immediately dominates(P, 
LI). (Recall that I assume that P is simply a word-external copy of some features of LI.) 
Chain and Project are unordered and create what we may call, the "(syntactic) input list." 
(The concept of input list is different from, though related to Chomsky’s concept of 
"numeration.") The input list then consists of several types of objects: (i) Lis, (ii)copies of 
Lis, (iii) phrases dominating Lis (LIPs) (iv) copies of LIPs.
Although some of the objects in the input list can be complex, they all involve a single 
lexical item. The input list thus can be taken as the normal form in which Lis are presented 
to syntax. The operation of Insert then applies to the elements of the input list. Insert 
establishes immediate dominance relations. (Notice that since a chain is a set of copies it is 
not a member of the input list, although members of the chain are members of the input list). 
For a concrete example consider (16) with the simplified structure in (17):
(16) Jean embrasse Pierre
(17) [jp NP V+I [vp (NP) (V) NP* ]
(18) a. Chain V,V
b. Project NP*>N*, NP>N, VP>V, IP > I
c. Chain NP>N, N P>N
d. Insert all
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(19) a. V, V P>V  NP*> N*, NP>N, NP>N, IP> I 
b. IP>N P, I> V , IP>V P, VP>NP, VP> NP*
(where X > Y means X immediately dominates Y)
If Chain applies before Project, it creates a head-chain as in (18a). If it applies to an element 
after Project applied to it, it creates a copy of the LIP, hence an XP-chain as in (18c). I 
assume that when Chain applies to LIPs, it creates a copy of the whole of the project relation, 
ie. it does not simply copy the phrasal node, but also the LI that projected it and the relation 
of immediate domination created by Project. Chain and Project in (18a,b,c) create the input 
list shown in (19a). Notice that the input list is not unstructured: it has two types of relations 
between its members: the copy relation and the immediate dominance relation. Finally Insert 
applies, relating elements in the input list by simultaneously establishing the further immediate 
dominance relations in (19b). Insert can only add relations, but cannot contradict hierarchical 
relations established by Project in the input list.
There are essentially two core concepts the theory is built on: the concept of copy and 
the structural notion of immediate domination. Both concepts are involved in the notion of 
projection: a projection of LI is a copy of a subset of the features of LI that immediately 
dominates LI. Only the notion of copy is involved in the Chain operation and only immediate 
domination in Insert. A major advantage of such a system is that the structure is built in one 
step, there are no intermediate syntactic structures, ie. no structures distinct from LF where 
lexical items are related to each other. (Notice that although the input list is structured, it is 
not a syntactic structure: all elements and all relations involve only a single lexical item.) The 
theory is thus able to explain the basic minimalist generalization that no conditions can hold 
on non-interface structures. This is because they do not exist
Numerous questions arise about this theory of one-step assembly of syntactic structure. 
Many of these are not specific to this system like for example what sort of word-internal 
structure should Insert establish. Take the second element of (19b): "I>V ". Let us assume 
for this case that in addition to the word-external copy of (some feature of) LI (ie. the 
phrase), there are also non word-external projections. Such a projection of I (the highest one 
that is not a phrase) will then dominate V.
Another question that is only partly specific to this framework has to do with the 
notion of copy. Since XP-chains are formed by copying an Xmax, there must be a 
nondistinctness requirement on copies in chains to ensure that the same argument and 
selectional structure is inserted in all copies/members of XP-chains. For example we need to 
ensure that the principle C violation indicated in (20) can be ruled out at or beyond LF. This 
cannot be done if the chain-member in the lower (bracketed) position is simply the empty XP 
projected by the highest head of the antecedent (DP projected by which in (20a) and PP 
projected by to in (20b)).
(20) a. *Which claim that Johnx was asleep did hex deny (which 
claim that Johnx was asleep)
b. *To Johnx hex gave a snake (to Johnx)
The status of chain-members as copies must be accessible to the post-LF interpretive 
systems in every minimalist framework: copies that are members of the same chain must be 
distinguished at least at LF from accidentally identical Lis and LIPs that are not chain related. 
Suppose then that structures in which two copies/chain-members dominate distinct elements 
cannot be interpreted, that these are not proper copies. The nondistinctness condition will thus
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constrain the selectional requirements and therefore both chains members in (20a,b) will 
dominate the same elements. Take for example (20b). Here the chain is formed on the PP that 
was projected by the preposition to, ie. on "PP>to". The preposition in both copies selects 
a complement which then must be the same in both copies by the nondistinctness condition. 
The account is the same in the case of (20a), with the selectional requirements of heads 
applying recursively. The head of the highest DP in the copy selects an NP, which must have 
been projected by the noun claim given nondistinctness. This noun then selects a CP etc.
(In Brody 1994 I took "Near John he saw a snake" to be grammatical on the 
coreferential reading. If it is in fact not better than (20), then it needs no additional comment. 
If however I was correct in taking this reading here significantly better, then we can attribute 
this improvement to the option of not chain-relating the adjunct PP to the IP-internal position, 
-an  option not available in the case of the selected PP.)
Notice that the copy of the lexical item involved in projection, serving as the phrasal 
node, appears not be subject to this interpretive non-distinctness condition: the head of a 
phrase never dominates elements like the complement and the specifier of the phrase, which 
the phrase contains. One possibility would be to take the copying involved in projection to 
be purely mechanical, the copy status of projection not being accessible to interpretation. But 
optimally we would not want to assume that only certain copies are taken to be copies by the 
interpretive components. In fact there is no need to make this assumption, since we can 
distinguish the two cases in terms of an independently motivated distinction. The copy 
operation involved in chains (at least in those corresponding to the "overt movement" relation, 
see section 4.2 below) targets a category together with its content. The copy relation involved 
in categorial projection targets the category only and ignores its content, in fact it probably 
targets only a subset of the category’s features. For example the selectional or the 
phonological features of an LI will not be present on the LIP. In this respect categorial 
projection appears to be similar to the copy relation involved in "covert movement" type 
relations (see section 4.2). If  this treatment of "covert movement" is correct, then the natural 
distinction having to do with the target of the copy relation is independently necessary.
Let us return then to the questions raised by the theory of phrase structure set out in 
section 3, namely (21):
(21) a. Why does the PPP (each phrase is projected by a LI) 
hold only for all and only non word-internal heads (cf.
(7))?
b. Why is projection local (no intervening elements 
between LI and the phrase it projects, cf. (8))?
c. Why is projection unique (each phrase is projected by a 
unique head, cf. (10))?
(21b) and (21c) receive an immediate answer, given the above theory of (L)LF assembly. 
Project applies before the syntactic structure is created (by Insert), and it applies separately 
to each head. Hence two Lis cannot project the same phrase and no ’foreign’ projection can 
ever intervene between a head and its projections in the input list. Since Insert cannot modify 
the hierarchical relations established by Project, the conclusion carries over to fully formed 
syntactic representations.
As for extended structure preservation (7), recall that the impossibility of word-internal 
phrases, (7b), has been attributed to the fact that morphology does not tolerate such
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constituents. The symmetry of (7) suggests an extension of this condition to (7a). Suppose we 
said that parallel to (7b), (7a) is due to syntax not tolerating non-phrasal elements. This would 
be an elegant modular solution, but unfortunately the condition is clearly incorrect: both 
phrases and nonphrasal elements (words) play a role in syntax. But let us reconsider this idea 
in the context of the system of LF assembly outlined. The modular solution is made available 
here by the separation of Project, where words play a syntactic role, and Insert, where they 
do not. So assume that Insert is modular in the relevant sense:
(22) Insert relates Lis to Lis (morphological application) and
phrases to phrases (syntactic application)
(22) entails that all non word-internal heads must project a phrase. If an LI does not 
project a phrase then only morphological Insert can apply to it, hence it will be word-internal. 
(Since Insert cannot destroy the hierarchical relations established in the input list, LI cannot 
dominate a projecting head H: HP then could not immediately dominate H.) It also follows 
from (22) that there can be no word-internal phrases: again these could only arise by Insert 
non-modularly combining Lis and phrases.
The theory of (L)LF assembly involving Chain, Project and Insert was originally 
constructed as a system that can build syntactic structures in one step from input lists. Since 
it did not create intermediate syntactic structures it explained the non-availability of these. As 
I just showed, the theory entails also the three basic stipulated properties of the theory of 
phrase structure: extended structure preservation, uniqueness and locality. While the lack of 
intermediate structures is a property that the present theory shares with the "no syntax" view 
outlined in section 1, without some theory like the proposed one of how structures are 
assembled, the three basic conditions on phrase structure would remain stipulative. The 
account therefore provides evidence for the assumption that syntax, in the sense of an 
assembly system, in fact exists as part of the system of grammatical competence.
4.2. F-movement and pied piping
The account of chain formation in Brody 1993a, 1995a, summarized and somewhat modified 
above incorporates what is in effect a "pied piping" hypothesis. Both head and XP chains are 
formed on an element that contains only a single lexical item. In the case of XP-chains this 
is the highest head of the phrase whose copies are the members of the chain. "Pied-piping" 
of the rest of chain, ie. filling out all the XP copies with material additional to this highest 
head is due as we have seen to selectional requirements applying recursively.
Chomsky 1995 presents a different theory of movement and chain formation which 
shares the general idea of pied piping with the above account. He proposes that movement 
can only take place to establish a checking relation, and for this only a feature F needs to 
move. Movement of categories occurs only in the overt component of the grammar and this 
is due to F-movement pied piping the whole category. Such pied piping in overt movement 
is forced by PF considerations. (There is an additional assumption that a set of features 
(formal features, FFs) are mechanically pied piped in both overt and covert movement.)
For example in "Whose book did you read" the +WH feature must move to establish 
a checking relation with the corresponding feature on the C node. It must pied pipe the word 
who, otherwise the PF features of this word would be scattered at PF, a state of affairs 
naturally taken as resulting in an ill-formed representation. The genitive Is must also be pied 
piped due to its affixal nature, thus whose must move together. But whose is not a syntactic
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object, it is not a constituent. Hence the whole phrase whose book must move together.
Abstracting away from the difference between movement and chain-formation (cf 
Brody 1995a for discussion), we see that the two theories have much in common. Both 
accounts assume that chains are formed on a single element of the head or phrase that 
ultimately is the member of the chain. Under the present proposal this element is the head of 
the chain member, in Chomsky’s theory it is the checking feature. The crucial difference 
appears to be that in the account defended here pied piping is due to LF requirements, 
whereas in Chomsky’s theory it is a consequence of PF conditions.
There are reasons to prefer the LF pied piping approach. Notice first that if whose 
pied pipes book because whose is not a constituent, then it is not clear why which in (23) — 
clearly a constituent— similarly pied pipes book.
(23) a. Which book did you read 
b. * Which did you read book
More importantly, in the PF pied piping theory the question arises why pied piping does not 
take place only in the SPELLOUT component? Given a minimalist perspective it is 
particularly difficult to understand why a PF requirement should force complications in the 
syntactic computation. But the assumption of SPELLOUT pied piping does not seem to be 
correct: the position of the "moved" phrase has syntactic and semantic effects. To take an 
emblematic example consider the contrast in (23):
(23) a. Mary wondered which picture of herself John saw
b *Mary wondered when John saw a/which picture of herself
If anything beyond the +W H feature (or the formal features of the wh-word) remained in situ 
in syntax, then we would expect (23a) to behave syntactically and semantically in a parallel 
way to (23b). This is incorrect however. Thus the contrast between (23a) and (23b) would 
be impossible to account for on the SPELLOUT pied piping hypothesis.
On the other hand as pointed out in earlier work cited above, there is evidence for pied 
piping being LF driven. The adjunct-argument asymmetry in reconstruction (Lebaux 1989) 
falls out from the non-distinctness requirement and projectional requirements discussed 
earlier.
(24) Which claim that Johnx made did hex later deny (which
claim)
(25) *Which claim that Johnx was asleep did hex deny (which 
claim that Johnx was asleep)
The principle C violation in (24) where, the relevant name, John is inside an adjunct (the 
relative clause) is weaker than in (25) (=(20a)) where it is inside a complement clause. As 
we have seen, selectional properties together with the nondistinctness requirement force the 
name in the complement to present in the bracketed copy in (25), and a principle C violation 
results. In (24) in contrast no selectional requirement forces the presence of the relative clause 
and the nondistinctness condition also allows its absence in the (bracketed) copy. Hence there 
is a structure of this sentence on which no principle C configuration obtains. Clearly the PF- 
triggered pied piping account will not be capable of capturing such a distinction, which falls 
out under an appropriately constructed LF pied piping account.
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Chomsky 1995 brings up another consideration: "The computation "looks at" only F 
[... ], though it "sees" more. The elementary procedure for determining the relevant features 
of the raised element x is another reflection of the strictly derivational approach to 
computation." ( section 4.4, p27) Thus for example in (26) there is no question of 
determining where the WH-feature is located inside the complex wh-phrase pictures of whose 
mother since the computation looks at such features directly: pied piping of the rest of the 
phrase is only an additional matter.
(26) Pictures of whose mother did you think were on the
mantelpiece
In reality however, the elementary procedure for determining the relevant checking 
feature is property of the pied piping theory. As we have seen a representational pied piping 
account is feasible (and also quite well-motivated), hence the question of derivationality does 
not seem relevant. Note furthermore, that in any case the pied piping theory does not seem 
to genuinely achieve a result here. The relation between the XP (in (26) the wh-phrase) and 
the checking feature F (in (26) the WH) remains mysterious also on the pied piping account. 
This is of course true of both the LF and the PF triggered version of the pied piping theory.
On the other hand the PF-triggered pied piping theory appears to create a genuine 
problem within the standard minimalist framework in that it creates a duplicate mechanism 
that appears conceptually and empirically unjustified. Consider a grammatical structure where 
movement without pied piping has taken place. This could in principle be due not only to the 
covert nature of the movement but also, as Chomsky notes (section 4.4, p23), to overt 
movement failing to pied pipe for whatever reason as for example in Watanabe’s (1992) 
theory. There is no genuine evidence for making the theory more permissive in this inelegant 
way. See Brody 1995a for a critical discussion of Watanabe’s theory. (The problem is in fact 
more general: in the versions of the minimalist theory that allow the SPELLOUT point to be 
distinct from (L)LF, empty categories can also be inserted both overtly and covertly.)
Let us consider also briefly the question of how overt and covert "movement" 
structures can be distinguished in the present framework. The simplest assumption is that the 
distinction does not pertain to syntax at all, that it is only a matter of SPELLOUT positions: 
in overt movement a higher copy, in covert movement a lower copy is subject to 
SPELLOUT. It seems to me that in a framework that assumes that there are no covert A’- 
movement relations there is little reason to depart from this simple hypothesis. If however 
there exist chains at LF corresponding to what used to be treated as covert A’-movement (cf 
Brody 1995a,b), then this will create problems for the simple SPELLOUT hypothesis. So for 
example if the relation between the wh-in-situ and the spec-CP position where it is interpreted 
is a chain relation, then spec-CP must not contain a full copy of the wh-in-situ at LF:
(27) a. John wondered which pictures of himself Mary bought (which
pictures of himself)
b. *John wondered which girl (which girl) bought which
pictures of himself
If the spec-CP of the embedded clause contained a full copy of the wh-in-situ which pictures 
of himself, then we would expect (27b) to be on a par with (27a), the anaphoric element 
should be appropriately bound by the matrix subject. But this is incorrect, and this suggests
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strongly that the higher position in the chain of the wh-in-situ must not contain a copy. In 
earlier work (Brody 1993a, 1995a) I treated these structures in terms of what I called 
"expletive-associate chains". Such chains expressed relations standardly treated in terms of 
LF-movement. In expletive-associate chains the chain-forming associate always remains in 
situ and the higher positions in the chain are not occupied by copies, but rather by an 
expletive element (or copies of this expletive). The expletive can carry features of the 
associate, -this accounted for various "agreement" effects (like checking of the WH-feature 
in covert wh-structures or subject verb agreement in there-associate structures etc.).
Chomsky’s 1995 theory of covert movement as movement of formal features (FF- 
movement) only does not essentially differ from this proposal. If we abstract away again from 
the representational/derivational difference, the major difference we find is that FF-movement 
is head movement, whereas expletive-associate chains may be either head chains or XP 
chains. Without attempting to resolve the issue, I note that what evidence currently exists 
appears to favour the hypothesis that chains corresponding to covert movement relations can 
be phrasal.
(28) There arrived three men
Raising of FF(a man) in (28) to T violates the head movement constraint, as Chomsky notes. 
The assumption that FF can be phrasal would avoid this problem. There are then two options: 
either FF is an additional specifier of T or FF is identical to there which spells it out. (The 
second version is fully equivalent to the expletive-associate chain solution.)
5. Explanations of the Generalized Projection Principle 
5.1. A non-syntactic account
The discussion of categorial projection would remain incomplete without the Generalized 
Projection Principle (GPP), a major and pervasive condition, one effect of which is the 
restriction of categorial projection to root positions of chains. Although the existence of deep 
structure as a distinct level of representation is quite dubious there are not many reasons to 
doubt the existence of the major generalization it expressed (Brody 1993b, 1995a, see also 
Chomsky 1993, 1994, 1995 for relevant discussion). This generalization, captured by the GPP 
refers not only to categorial projection but also to thematic selectional requirements, and in 
fact to syntactic and semantic selection in general. (I assume therefore that the GPP is a 
principle of the interpretive component.) All these requirements hold in the root positions of 
chains.
Thus for example a verb V raised to some higher functional projection, say C, never 
projects a VP here: categorial projection holds only in the root positions of chains. A V in 
C furthermore never forces the specifier and the complements of C to satisfy the selectional 
requirements of V: selectional requirements hold only in chain-roots. (For a potential well- 
defined set of principled exceptions see below.) I argued in earlier work that an appropriately 
formulated projection principle is both compatible with and necessary in a minimalist 
framework. In addition I attributed to the GPP the restriction against movement into a 
thematic position on the assumption that the GPP requires that selectional, including thematic, 
features not only must hold but also must be satisfied by root positions:
(29) Generalized Projection Principle
Projectional (categorial, thematic, selectional) features
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must hold in root positions of chains, thematic and 
selectional features must also be satisfied by root 
positions of chains
Notice that in contrast to selectional projection, categorial projection apparently can be 
satisfied by non-root positions, namely by phrases in XP-chains.
In what follows I would like to summarize and somewhat revise the explanation of the 
GPP given in Brody 1995a. I shall then comment on the alternative (partial) explanation of 
the GPP proposed in Chomsky 1994 and 1995. To set out the explanation of the GPP I will 
concentrate on selectional features, ignoring for the moment the complication having to do 
with categorial projection being satisfied by non-root positions in XP-chains. Consider two 
chains that are to be related by a selectional feature F. Suppose that F must identify all 
positions of the chain to which it is assigned and that all positions of the chain whose member 
assigns F must be marked as having assiged F. This second requirement is also natural in 
the framework of copy theory: other members of the head chain whose LI has F are copies 
of LI and will therefore also have F. In other words I assume that the two chains will be 
properly related iff all members of both chains are appropriately identified as related in this 
way.
(30) If a selectional (more generally projectional) feature F of a member of chain 
Cj selects (a member of) chain C2 then
(a) all members of C2 must be identified as being selected by F and
(b) all copies of F on members of Cj must be identified as having been 
assigned
Let us say that an assignee position is selectionally identified if it has the appropriate 
selectional feature F while the assigner position is selectionally identified if it has some 
feature S indicating that proper assignment has taken place. Let us make also a simplifying 
assumption (I shall return to this below): that a head can only select and an XP can only be 
selected in a single position in a chain. Suppose finally that feature percolation in chains can 
only take place bottom to top, it is strictly upward directional. It follows that the selectional 
feature F must be assigned to the most deeply embedded position in the assignee chain, 
otherwise lower positions in this chain will not be selectionally identified. Similarly F must 
be assigned from the most deeply embedded position of the assigner chain, otherwise the 
feature S indicating the satisfaction of the selectional requirement F cannot percolate to all 
members of the assigner chain. All members (copies) of the assigner chain carry the 
selectional feature which can only be satisfied through percolation of S under the assumption 
that a selectional feature can only be assigned once in any given chain.
Chains where a non-root position is selected (including "movement" to theta positions) 
are now impossible: the selectional feature cannot percolate to the lower position of the chain, 
which thus fails to be identified. Conversely, no selection can take place from a non-root 
position either. A V for example raised to I or C now cannot select from the higher position 
of its chain since the information that this feature is satisfied could not reach the lower 
position of the chain.
The requirement that feature percolation in chains is strictly upward is in effect an 
equivalent of the derivational principle excluding lowering applications of Move. In a 
framework that assumes the rule of Move, a representation that is in violation of the GPP 
could have arisen in two ways. Either through raising in violation of the derivational
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equivalent of the GPP prohibiting movement into a position that involves selectional features, 
or through lowering from this position. Downward spreading of the selectional features 
corresponds to lowering in a system incorporating Move. This needs to be excluded. Given 
this assumption the GPP reduces to the principle in (30) that all positions in a chain need to 
be selectionally (projectionally) identified. Thus while the GPP follows from fairly simple 
chain theoretical assumptions once the equivalent of lowering is excluded, the same 
explanation could not be translated into derivational terms in a system that assumes the 
operation Move. Excluding lowering rules would not help to explain why raising into a 
selected position is impossible.
Given the account so far, a selectional feature F on a member of a head chain can be 
satisfied in one of two ways. Either (a) directly, by assignment to some chain C’ (in the root 
of C’) or (b) indirectly, through the upward percolation of the satisfaction feature S. The 
requirement that feature percolation can only take place to c-commanding elements restricts 
direct satisfaction to the root position, given the additional assumption that direct satisfaction 
can occur only once in any given chain. But while this uniqueness assumption is not unnatural 
by itself, it fits rather uneasily with the rest of the theory here. If all members of a chain 
carry the selectional features that need to be satisfied, it is not immediately obvious why the 
direct satisfaction of these should be restricted by the fact that they are members of the same 
chain.
We cannot simply dispense with the uniqueness requirement however. If direct 
satisfaction of a given selectional requirement in more than one position was allowed in 
general, then GPP effects would not follow any more. Consider a selectional feature which 
is assigned to two different chains from two different positions of its own chain. This must 
not be allowed since it would for example result in a V selecting an object in the VP and then 
selecting another one in its higher position in the chain, hosted by I or C. A more natural 
uniqueness requirement that still rules out the unwanted consequence would be to require that 
a given selectional feature must be assigned to a unique chain. Adopting this weaker 
condition, a selectional feature can now be assigned from multiple positions in an assigner 
chain and to multiple positions in an assignee chain as long as the assignee chain is unique. 
Thus a raised V can now select from its higher position as long as it selects a member of the 
same chain it selected a member of in its lower position.
In the case of experiencer predicates and several other related constructions there is 
evidence for exactly this type of multiple direct satisfaction of a thematic requirement (cf. 
especially Pesetsky 1995). The literature contains numerous arguments that the subject in (31) 
is an internal argument, cf. eg. Belletti and Rizzi 1988.
(31) This worries me
At the same time there are various indications like the possibility of passivization etc. 
suggesting strongly that the subject of (31) is external. Pesetsky resolves the conflict by 
allowing the same theta role to be assigned to more than one position in a chain. The 
availability of this option is exactly what follows from the present theory under the weaker 
version of the uniqueness hypothesis.
Let us finally return to the effects of the GPP for categorial projection. Recall that 
categorial projection is exactly like selection in that it is invariably initiated in the root 
positions of assigner chains. Our explanation of the GPP will then immediately predict this 
state of affairs once it is generalized from selectional features to cover also categorial
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features, ie. features involved in categorial projection. Recall that categorial projection 
appeared to differ from selection in that a categorial feature can be received by non-root 
elements of an assignee XP-chain. For example all DPs in a DP-chain receive the categorial 
feature D from their respective D heads. But only one of these DPs is the root of the XP- 
chain. This appears to contrast with selectional features: a non-root position generally cannot 
be selected. But given the weakening of the uniqueness condition this generalization now has 
a set of systematic exceptions. As exemplified by (31) a chain may be selected in more than 
one position as long as it is selected by the same features. So categorial projection features 
in effect behave again just like selectional features: non-root members of XP-chains can 
receive a categorial projection feature (can be projected) because all members of XP chains 
receive exactly the same categorial projection feature.
The similar behavior of selection and categorial projection suggests that we should 
distinguish both of these features from checking features. I shall continue to refer to the 
former group as projectional features. I assume that both checking and projectional features 
relate chains, rather than categories, but they do so in a different way. Checking features are 
properties of chains. If such a feature is checked, then it is automatically taken to be checked 
in all copies (chain members) in the chain, independently of whether the copies are in a 
higher or lower position. A natural way of capturing this is to say that the checking feature 
is a property of the chain, rather than a property of the category from which it originates. 
Projectional features are different. Although a projectional feature also relates chains, it does 
not become a chain-property but remains the property of the category that is lexically 
specified to carry it. The difference presumably is another manifestation of the difference 
between grammaticalized "formal features" and other semantic features. (Notice that the 
similarity between selectional features and categorial projection casts some doubt on the idea 
that categorial features can serve as formal checking features. The features participating in 
categorial projection appear to behave like other non-formal semantic selectional properties 
and unlike formal checking features.)
Let us close this discussion of the GPP with an illustration of the interaction of this 
principle with the theory of (L)LF assembly. Consider a "moved" non chain-root head H 
inserted/substituted in some phrase, XP. Given the modularity of Insert, H must project a 
phrasal node HP, Insert can only combine a phrase with a phrase. There are two options to 
consider: the projected phrase HP may be either internal to the phrase, XP to which H 
substituted or it may force the category label of the target XP to be (H)P. Both options must 
be excluded. They both are excluded by the GPP: projection is restricted to root positions. 
Thus the GPP and the modularity of Insert together ensure that "moved" non chain-root heads 
must invariably be head-internal. It is important to see that there is no direct contradiction 
between modular Insert and the GPP. They only create a contradiction for word-external 
heads in non chain root positions. Insert requires all word-external heads to project a phrase 
and the GPP restricts all projection to originate in root positions of chains. Hence word- 
external heads that are not in root positions can neither project nor not project: they cannot 
exist.
5.2 Conspiracy theories of the GPP
Chomsky 1994, and Chomsky 1995 provide different explanations of certain effects of the 
GPP. The effects of the GPP fall into two classes. One effect is that (i) categorial projection 
always holds in the root position and another consequence as we have seen is that (ii)
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selectional (thematic) properties also hold in and are generally (apart from cases like (31)) 
satisfied by root positions.
I shall focus on the issue in (i) first and start with the solution in Chomsky 1994. Here 
the generalization that categorial projection always takes place in root position results from 
conditions answering four distinct questions:
(32) a. Why cannot a head in a substituted nonchain-root 
position project?
b. Why cannot a head in an adjoined nonchain-root 
position project?
c. Why cannot an XP in a substituted nonchain-root 
position project further?
d. Why cannot an XP in an adjoined nonchain-root position 
project further?
(32a,b), --heads in non root position cannot project: This is because the HMC 
would force such a raised head oc to substitute into or adjoin to the ocP, the phrase oc itself 
projected. This is prohibited by the fact that such "self attachment" would create an 
ambiguity: in such structures if the category/segment (ocP) that dominates cx in the non root 
position can be taken to have inherited its label from oc in the non root position or from the 
ocP that oc projected in its root position. It is not clear however why the ambiguity of "self 
attachment" cases of adjoined and substituted projecting head should create a violation.
There is an additional case of adjoined non-root heads to consider for which the 
prohibition concerning self-attachment is not relevant, --namely where the head oc in the 
non-root position is adjoined to another head. This is the usual configuration of head chains 
and thus cannot be excluded in general, oc in this adjoined non root position of course 
cannot project either. But it is not clear what excludes here the configuration where the 
moved element projects instead of the head to which it adjoined.
(32c), —substituted non-heads cannot project: Turning to the question of why non 
heads ie. phrases cannot project further in non chain root positions, the substitution case is 
ruled out by the principle of Greed. Greed states that "Move raises oc only if morphological 
properties of oc itself would not be satisfied in the derivation". In a configuration like (33) 
if XP* raises to K and then projects X P + , then XP* ceases to be a maximal projection, given 
the relational definition of projectional status.
(33) * [xp+ XPx* [K t, ]]
XP* then will be "invisible for the computational system", which only sees non projected 
elements and maximal projections and therefore cannot "enter into a checking relation"
But the raised XP in (33) could satisfy Greed before it projects (cf.: "Adjunction to X’ 
by merger does not conflict with the conclusion that X’ is invisible to [the computational 
system of the grammar]; at the point of adjunction, the target is an XP, not X’." p.32.) So 
at the "point of substitution" the raised element is a maximal projection, not an X’.
There is an additional reason given in Chomsky 1994 for the ungrammaticality of (33), 
namely the uniformity condition, This also rules out (33) since here the trace of XP* is 
maximal (by hypothesis) but XP* is not. But as we have seen in section 2, there are strong 
reasons to reject the uniformity condition.
(32b,d), -adjoined heads cannot project and non-heads (phrases) cannot project
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further: An adjoined element that projects would create the following configuration:
(34) * U  « x  [K t, ]
Chomsky assumes that the two-segment category in adjunction involves two elements that 
have the status of a category: the lower segment and the two segments together. On this 
assumption Full Interpretation is violated in (34). Whichever of the two categories, oc or the 
two-segment element [ oc, oc ] is taken to be the head of the chain whose root is , the 
other element receives no interpretation at LF and thus violates FI. Chomsky ”conclude[s] 
that the target must have projected". Taking [oc, oc] to be the head of the chain is ruled out 
additionally by the UC. (This seems to work only where oc is non-maximal, if oc is maximal 
then so is [oc, oc], hence the UC is not violated.)
The fact that in adjunction structures there is only one LF role for the two segment 
category [K,K] and the category corresponding to the lower segment, K is a general problem 
in adjunction however, whichever category projects. (This appears to be recognized in 
Chomsky 1995.) To allow adjunction to heads Chomsky invokes WI: the relevant restrictions 
again do not hold word internally. For non-heads he suggests that this fact essentially restricts 
adjunction to nonthematic categories (plus some other restricted cases, see the appendix 
below). But if WI can neutralize the problem when a minimal projection oc adjoins to X and 
X projects, WI will also neutralize the problem if oc projects. Hence the conclusion that the 
non root element cannot project does not follow.
Similar comments hold for nonminimal projections. If a configuration in which the 
target of adjunction is in a nonthematic position is permitted because no problem arises with 
FI, then in the same kind of position the adjoined element should be able to project without 
violating this principle. This again is probably an incorrect result.
Additionally, the assumption that there are exactly three elements in adjunction 
structures with the status of a category seems somewhat stipulative. Even granting that 
assumption, further questions arise. For example it is not clear why oc and [oc, oc] could not 
jointly serve as the antecedent of the trace.
Chomsky 1995 approaches the generalization that phrasal projection always takes place 
from chain-root positions somewhat differently. He rejects earlier formulations of Greed, and 
tentatively assumes that word-external adjunction does not exist (cf. also Brody 1994 and 
above). He bases much of the argument on the hypothesis that movement can only take place 
to ’immediately’ establish a checking configuration. This hypothesis has a somewhat dubious 
status as it is in conflict with apparently well-established cases of successive cyclic movement 
where intermediate landing sites involve no checking (eg. adjunct wh-movement in English). 
Given this assumption however, word-external head movement cases will obey the 
generalization in (i), since if a moved head oc projects, it necessarily establishes a head 
complement relation with its target K: [a oc K]. Checking relations can only be established 
in spec-head configurations. (Notice though, that it is only because non-branching projections 
do not exist in this system (in contrast to the theory of assembly adopted earlier where they 
do) that the conclusion that K is the complement of oc follows. In [Ä [<* oc] K], K would 
be a specifier. )
As before, the account does not extend to the word-internal domain. But the 
generalization (i) that a moved head does not project of course does. In the word-internal 
domain Chomsky has to distinguish two cases: structures where the moved head H’ adjoins 
to some other head H that projects a phrase HP and structures where H’ adjoins to some head 
H” , where H” itself is adjoined to H or to some other head adjoined to H. In the former case
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if H’ projects we get (35) since HP must have been projected before H’ raised and projected.
(35) [HP [H. H’ H]]
Chomsky proposes that the resulting structure is not well-formed: HP has no appropriate 
head. In effect he proposes a recursive filter (his (5)) which defines well-formed syntactic 
objects and rejects (35). But this seems to be an extremely dubious move. In a derivational 
theory the derivation necessarily provides a recursive definition of well-formed syntactic 
objects, no filter should duplicate this function. The independent evidence for such a filter is 
rather weak, but even if it was strong it would be difficult to be convinced of the necessity 
of such a filter: a well-designed theory just should not make it possible to violate it. (Hence 
in such a theory the GPP effect must be derived differently.)
Further conditions are required if H’ illegitimately projects after raising and adjoining 
to some head H” that is itself adjoined to a projecting head H. Here we get a structure like
(36) , where the considerations just reviewed are not relevant.
(36) [H [H’ H’ H” ] H]
Turning to the question of why a moved XP cannot project further, the formulation 
of Greed that was taken to be relevant earlier is rejected here, and the impossibility of (33) 
is attributed to the uniformity condition, which I found numerous reasons to question in 
section 2 above.
Chomsky tentatively considers also another approach according to which the checking 
relation is asymmetrical and requires the checked element to be in the spec of the checking 
head. This would not be satisfied in (33). Here the head of K is taken to be the checking head 
and XP the checked element but XP is not a spec since its head projects the phrase, —instead 
K is the spec of XP. Chomsky notes several problems with this solution, but in any case it 
seems to contribute little: if checking is asymmetric in the way suggested then the question 
still remains: why cannot a checking relation be established in (33)? K cannot be the checking 
XP now, but X could in principle check K, unless we stipulate that the target of movement 
must be the checker. But that is barely different from the original problem to be explained: 
the target must project.
Let us consider next the solutions in Chomsky 1994 and Chomsky 1995 for the other 
GPP effect: that thematic properties must hold and be be satisfied by chain roots. Chomsky 
1994 does not discuss the problem of why the selectional (thematic etc.) requirements of 
heads have to hold in the root position of their chain, so I shall put this aside for the moment. 
The paper provides an account of the fact that thematic requirements must be satisfied by 
chain roots.
Consider the the hypothetical verbs HIT and BELIEVE that assign a theta role to their 
subject but no Case to their object. The GPP explains why such verbs cannot exist given the 
independently motivated assumption that the Caseless object position in structures like (37) 
must form a chain with the subject position: such a chain involves a non-root theta position.
(37) a. *John [VP f  [HIT t ]]
b. *John [VP f  [BELIEVE [t to VP]]]
In derivational terms the generalization translates as a ban on movement to thematic positions.
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Chomsky 1994 attributes this also to the principle of Greed. The DP John in (37) cannot raise 
to spec-VP to pick up the unassigned theta role, since it does not need to do so to satisfy its 
own requirements.
Even if the DP originates in a non-theta position Greed would prevent raising to a 
theta position on the assumption that "the need for a theta role is not a formal property, like 
Case, that permits "last resort" movement". This explanation may not be general enough. The 
prohibition against movement to theta positions holds also for theta positions that are at the 
same time also Case positions. To illustrate, consider the hypothetical preposition IN, which 
is like "in" except that it does not assign Case. This should allow a structure like (38a).
(38) a. I gave John the study IN t
b. cf: I gave John a book in the study
The GPP predicts that such structures are ungrammatical and that therefore prepositions like 
IN cannot exist. The explanation based on Greed does not have this consequence, unless not 
only structural Case positions but all Case positions are taken to be systematically distinct 
from theta positions.
Secondly the Greed based account allows movement to a theta position when this is 
made necessary by some other principle. This again seems to be an incorrect prediction. For 
example Relativized Minimality /Minimal Chain Link Condition (MCL) can force movement 
through a theta position in a derivation in which a later step satisfies Greed. To see this 
consider first Chomsky’s analysis of the ungrammaticality of (39):
(39) *John reads often books
(40) [VP John [v. v [vp/2 often [v, reads books]]]]
He suggests that (39) has the structure in (40), and this is ruled out since the adverbial in 
spec-VP/2 prevents raising of the object books to spec-AgrO. "Note the crucial assumption 
that the subject John is in [SPEC, VP]... otherwise that position would be an "escape hatch" 
for the raising of books" p.33.
Consider in this light (41), that contains the verb HIT that assigns no accusative but is 
otherwise like hit. In (41) movement lands in a theta position:
(41) John [VP t [VP/2 often HITs t ]]
Here the DP John must raise outside the VP in order to get Case. But then as we have seen 
in the case of (39), relativized minimality/MCL forces it through [SPEC, VP] where it can 
pick up the subject theta role. Thus the nonexistence of a verb like HIT is not predicted.
As noted, Chomsky 1995 assumes that every application of Move must establish a 
checking relation and rejects the earlier formulation of Greed. He provides here a different 
account of why movement cannot land in thematic positions, one that is meant to generalize 
to answer also the question why all thematic selection holds in chain-root positions: "With 
regard to assignment of theta-role, the conclusion is natural in the Hale-Keyser theory. A 
theta role is assigned in a certain structural configuration; ß assigns that theta-role only in the 
sense that it is the head of that configuration... Suppose ß raises, forming the chain 
CH = (jS,...,t)." "...the chain CH is not in a configuration at all so cannot assign a theta-role. 
In its raised position, ß can function insofar as it has formal features: as a Case assigner or
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a binder. But in a configurational theory of theta relations, it makes little sense to think of 
the head of a chain as assigning a theta role." (section 6, pi)
First of all it is not clear that it is any more natural (and it is certainly not 
independently motivated) to assume that a chain is "not in any configuration at all", rather 
than take it to be in multiple configurations. But more importantly perhaps the question is 
why "it makes little sense" to think of the head of a nontrivial chain as a theta-role assigner? 
In particular why it makes little sense to think of the head of the chain as a theta-role assigner 
when apparently the root of the chain can be a theta role assigner: "The trace t remains in the 
structural configuration that determines a theta role and can therefore function as a theta-role 
assigner..." It is true that in its raised position ß cannot assign a theta role, or more generally 
activate any of its selectional features. But surely ß is in some configuration in its raised 
position.
So what we in fact need is a characterization of configurations where selection is 
possible and those where it is impossible. An obvious possibility would be to assume that only 
categorially projecting heads can select. This will work once categorial projection itself is 
restricted to chain-roots. Although perhaps not unnatural it is clearly an additional stipulation 
that should be unnecessary. It is, if categorial projection and selection are both cases of 
semantic (non-formal) feature assignment constrained directly by the GPP as argued in section
5.1.
"With regard to receipt of theta-role, similar reasoning applies. If oc raises to a theta- 
position TH  forming the chain C H  = (oc ,t), the argument that must bear the theta role is C H , 
not o c . But CH  is not in any configuration, and oc is not an argument that can receive a 
theta-role." Again it is not clear why the chain is not in any configuration. But independently 
of this, the paragraph is difficult to interpret. If the chain and not oc must bear the theta-role 
and the chain cannot, then we have a violation of the theta criterion also in the grammatical 
cases where the chain would receive the theta-role in its root position. Given minimalist 
assumptions oc cannot receive the theta-role before it moves, this would be resurrecting D- 
structure (on the reasons for rejecting D-structure cf. Brody 1993b, 1995a, Chomsky 1993). 
Thus we seem to be left without an account of the selectional effects of the GPP. Recall also 
that the discussion of these effects in Chomsky 1994, 1995 does not address the recalcitrant 
exception exemplified in (31) above. (Boskovic 1993 points out other cases apparently 
problematic for the GPP. See however Brody 1995a for an alternative analysis of these.)
In sum there are numerous uncertainties and unsolved problems associated with 
Chomsky’s approach to the GPP effects. But the most important general objection is probably 
the familiar one with this type of approach that accounts for a major and simple generalization 
in terms of a complex conspiracy of principles. Such an approach appears plausible where the 
generalisation in question has a set of exceptions in need of an explanation: then the 
conspiracy can explain why the apparent generalization is true exactly for the cases for which 
it is. But a conspiracy account of a major and apparently unexceptional generalization makes 
the implausible and methodologically objectionable claim that the generalization is a —highly 
improbable— accident.
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Appendix
Chomsky 1994, 1995 suggests a theory that radically restricts word-external adjunction 
but (in 1995 tentatively and partially only) retains this configuration in cases where the target 
has no theta role (expletive-associate chains) or where in his derivational system the adjunct 
is not present at LF (intermediate traces deleted by LF and "semantically vacuous" scrambling 
where LF reconstruction eliminates the scrambled element). These cases do not seem to 
provide strong motivation for retaining the configuration. LF adjunction of the associate to 
its expletive chain-mate is a problematic and probably unnecessary operation. The agreement 
facts, which constitute the main evidence for this operation can be treated without actual 
deplacement of the associate, cf. Brody 1993a, 1995. This is also recognized in Chomsky 
1995, —cf. section 4.2 above)
The necessity of adjoined intermediate traces in non-uniform chains is equally moot 
(cf. eg. Manzini 1992). Notice that the best and perhaps only strong evidence for their 
existence has to do with reconstruction effects (Lebaux 1989, Barrs 1986). For example in
(42) binding of the anaphor appears to be licensed from the position that is internal to the 
intermediate trace/copy:
(42) Which picture of herself did John think Mary told t Bill
to buy t
But in the minimalist framework such evidence supports the copy theory of movement. Given 
the basic assumption of this framework, that conditions (like the binding theory) hold only 
at and/or beyond the interface levels, evidence like (42) shows that contrary to Chomsky’s 
suggestion in this context, intermediate traces/copies must be present at LF (cf. Chomsky 
1993, Brody 1995a).
As for scrambling, an alternative treatment of radical reconstruction may be to 
consider it to be stylistic deplacement, ie. taking place in the SPELLOUT component cf. 
Aoun 1995. Chomsky suggests that LF reconstruction will provide an account of the contrast 
he finds between English topicalization cases like (43a) and (43b). Assuming that these work 
like scrambling, the expectation is that (43a), the adjunct case, is worse since forced 
reconstruction in this example will create a configuration that violates principle C. Since the 
fronted phrase "which pictures of John’s brother" is not an adjunct in (43b), this example 
will not be similarly excluded:
(43) a. Pictures of Johnx’s brother, hex never expected that I
would buy
b. Which pictures of Johnx’s brother did hex expect that I
would buy
But forced reconstruction of adjuncts would loose the explanation of the contrasts like 
those between (44a) and (44b) or (44c) and (44d), which depend precisely on forced 
reconstruction of the selected argument but not of the unselected category internal to the 
fronted phrase, —cf. Lebaux 1989, and Chomsky 1993, Brody 1995a, for different ways of 
instantiating this idea. (Notice that no configurational distinction needs to be assumed to 
capture the difference, the selected/nonselected contrast suffices.) Now if topicalization is 
adjunction and adjuncts are reconstructed then (44a,b) should contrast with (44c,d) rather 
than (44a) and (44c) with (44b) and (44d):
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(44) a. Which claim that Johnx made did hex deny
b . ?*Whose claim that Johnx was asleep did hex deny
c. The claim that Johnx made about this, hex later denied
d . ?*The claim that Johnx was asleep all day hex later
denied
Thus the evidence for an account involving forced reconstruction of elements adjoined 
to semantically nonvacuous categories seems unconvincing. Its support for the more general 
claim that word-external adjunction exists in syntax (under restricted circumstances) is 
therefore weak.
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Perfect Chains
1. Towards Perfect Syntax
1.1. Duplications, conditions on chains, economy
In the Principles and Parameters theory representational conditions on various levels carried 
most of the burden of restricting syntax. In the minimalist framework representational 
conditions will only hold at interface levels, the only levels that exist. Let us assume the 
strong version of the minimalist hypothesis according to which syntactic interface conditions 
are "bare output conditions", that is conditions forced on syntax by the interpretive systems 
that are fed by the syntactic computations. Suppose furthermore that most of the effects of 
representational conditions of the Principles and Parameters theory turn out to be the effects 
of either bare output conditions or of conditions holding within the syntax-external systems. 
If so, then we may expect the syntactic computation, whose task is to assemble interface 
representations from a set of lexical items, to be near-trivial.
In any case the syntactic system may turn out to be significantly more trivial than in 
standard minimalist theories. One area where simplification is achievable is the derivational 
duplication of representational concepts. A central case is the independently motivated 
interface notion of Chain which captures the same relations as the derivational rule of Move, 
making the latter redundant and in fact untenable in a restrictive system. Notice that 
eliminating Move in favor of Chain does not necessarily make the theory strictly non- 
derivational: see the one step derivational theory of Brody 1995a,b. It will however 
necessarily make the architecture of the mapping system between lexical items and the two 
interfaces radically simpler: since there are no intermediate structures between the lexical 
input and the semantic interface, this level has to serve as the input to the SPELLOUT 
component. There is therefore only a single syntactic interface level, say the level of Lexico­
logical Form (LLF) of Brody 1993a, 1995a, which is the input to both semantic interpretation 
and the SPELLOUT component.
There are various other related distinctions and duplications that seem equally dubious. 
For example Chomsky 1995 proposes a representational definition in addition to the 
derivational system of interface assembly (in effect an additional definition) of what counts 
as a well-formed syntactic object (cf. Brody 1995b for some discussion). Or take the 
additional distinction he makes between deletion (interface invisibility only) and erasure 
(essentially invisibility also for Move), where erasure occurs only if this would not violate 
the representational duplicate definition of well-formed syntactic object. Such duplications, 
and distinctions that build on these duplications should have no place in a restrictive system 
of syntax.
Another area where we might expect the system of interface assembly to be radically 
simplified has to do with economy conditions. Strong empirical argument is necessary to 
motivate the undesirable complication of the system of assembly which would make it 
powerful enough to compare derivations, -especially in view of the attendant computational 
complexity. It does not seem unreasonable to think that economy conditions will be 
eliminable without the introduction of any additional apparatus. More recent versions of 
economy conditions that "compare locally" seem to represent no major improvement in 
computational complexity. Suppose that at any stage in the derivation only the possible 
continuations of the derivation already constructed are compared. But clearly, for any
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comparison of full derivations we can construct an equally complex comparison of 
"continuations", simply by embedding the appropriate structure. Notice that in order for the 
comparison to be meaningful, it cannot be restricted to look only at a single step in the 
relevant derivations. The derivations in which a step or a series of steps will be compared 
must all be carried out fully, if only to check that they converge, given the assumption -an  
inevitable one as Chomsky 1995 explains—, that economy conditions select only among 
converging derivations.
A third set of concepts and conditions that should have no place syntax-internally in 
a restrictive system of interface assembly pertain to the Chain/Move relation. Assuming that 
the relation is part of syntax proper, various conditions on this relation like Uniformity, c- 
command, Last Resort, Minimal Chain Link and Procrastinate should still be attributable to 
the syntax external systems (either as matters internal to the interpretive components or as 
properties imposed by these on syntax, ie. bare output conditions) or eliminable in some other 
way. Uniformity was discussed in this light in Brody 1995b, treatment of the other 
minimalist conditions on Chain/Move will be the main subject of the present paper.
1.2 Interactions with the interpretive components
In Brody 1995a I proposed an interface assembly system based on the notions of copy and 
immediate domination that complies with these restrictions. I used the term perfect syntax to 
refer to the theory that postulated such a near-trivial assembly system. There are two 
additional general constraints related to the interaction of the assembly system with the 
interpretive components that the standard minimalist framework does not incorporate, but we 
might expect perfect syntax to meet. One of these has to do with the nature of the interaction 
between syntax and the interpretive systems. In the standard minimalist framework it is 
suggested that imperfections in syntax are due to the effect of the interpretive components. 
Bare output conditions will be satisfied optimally, but this may necessitate departures from 
perfection. In particular it is often suggested that the fact that syntax has the Chain/Move 
relation is an imperfection due to output conditions. Chomsky 1995 contains also the further 
suggestion that the optimal operation of Move is covert (feature-movement only) and overt 
movement of categories is again due to interpretive (PF) pressures. These pressures could 
have to do for example with strong checking features holding at PF (although this assumption 
is rejected in Chomsky 1995) or with the necessity of moved features pied piping full 
constituents to avoid PF crash.
The idea that the components interacting with syntax force additional imperfect 
operations on this system seems to raise problems. Without further assumptions, whose nature 
seems unclear, for the external systems to cause the addition of imperfect operations to syntax 
it is necessary that perfection in syntax and the demands of the external system be in conflict. 
But it seems difficult to think of a case where the external demands could not be met in some 
alternative way without sacrificing perfection. If so, then given usual methodology, we would 
expect the system to choose the more perfect option. To look at the actual proposals 
concerning Move, consider the hypothesis that the existence of this operation is forced by the 
bare output condition of full interpretation. This requires certain features to be checked at LF 
by features of lexical items generated elsewhere. But if Move is an imperfection, there are 
in principle many ways in which it could be avoided without violating full interpretation. For 
example the checking features could freely delete or they could be generated in a position that 
is accessible to the lexical item without movement etc. It is not easy to see why all the
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alternative options should be in principle unavailable.
(Notice incidentally that the proposal that Move is forced by bare output conditions 
interacts only with some redundancy with Chomsky’s (1995) assumption that strong features 
are intolerable in the derivation. Given the additional distinction between +/- Interpretable 
checking features, Move will sometimes be forced by full interpretation (to eliminate weak 
non-interpretable features of hosts) and sometimes by both derivation-technological reasons 
and full interpretation (to eliminate strong non-interpretable features and (non-interpretable) 
"strength" of interpretable features). See below in sections 2 and 4 for related discussion.)
Similar comments apply to the question of overt Move. If overtness of Move is an 
imperfection and the optimal way of satisfying the constraints requiring movement is covert 
feature-movement, then overt movement of categories within the mapping between lexical 
items and (L)LF could be avoided for example by eliminating strong features, or by 
restricting overt movement to the SPELLOUT component. (See Brody 1995b for evidence 
that this latter possibility is not what actually happens.) Many other options are imaginable, 
which seem extremely difficult to rule out on principled grounds.
Let us avoid such problems and assume that the syntax-external components cannot 
force imperfect additions to syntax. This is then the first general condition promised above, 
related to the interaction of syntax with the interpretive systems. There will still remain at 
least two potential sources of imperfections. One can imagine that there might be cases of 
apparent imperfection: where syntactic perfection cannot be observed due to the limited 
expressive power of the interpretive modules. Non-apparent imperfection might also arise 
however, if the interpretive modules can cause the syntax internal imperfect instantiation of 
a perfect syntactic property or relation by not being able to interpret a perfect instantiation.
Returning to the concrete case of Chain/Move, this is simply an instance of the copy 
relation. It is not necessary to take this relation to be an imperfection, indeed within the 
assembly system of Brody 1995b this would not even be possible. In this theory the copy 
relation is involved also in categorial projection and is the only basic concept apart from the 
hierarchical notion of immediate domination. As for chains corresponding to "overt 
movement" of a full category, again this is simply the copy relation, where only the highest 
copy is visible for the SPELLOUT component. In the case of "expletive-associate" (Brody 
1993a, 1995a) or "feature-movement" (Chomsky 1995) chains, the copy relation is not 
between full lexical items, but between features. See Brody 1995a,b for some discussion of 
why it may not be correct to eliminate syntax internally the distinction between chains where 
the copy relation is between full lexical items and chains where it is between features, by 
treating "covert movement" relations as full copies with a lower SPELLOUT position.
Given the distinction between feature copy chains and full category copy chains, it 
seems possible to view one of the two instances of the relation as an imperfect version of the 
other. Suppose that in the spirit of Earliness (Pesetsky 1989) or Transparency (Brody 1995a), 
we take the full categorial copy to be the default operation, and consider copying a proper 
subset of features as a degenerate case.
Suppose further that we assume that "covert movement" relations involve head-internal 
(Xmm-internal) feature-copies. This latter option will be taken only when the former is 
impossible. We can assume that the option of copying a full category is conditioned by the 
morphological properties of the head with which the copy will establish a checking relation. 
A head (more precisely a checking feature of a host head) may or may not have the ability 
to establish a head-external checking relation. (In fact we may need to distinguish checking 
features that license head-external but word (X°)-intemal relation, ie. an "overt" X°-chain and 
features that license also word-external checking ("overt" XP-chains). Further, there is
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evidence for three word-external choices: zero, one or multiple word-external checking 
relations.)
Licensing a head-external checking relation is matter of morphology, internal to the 
SPELLOUT component. When the relevant checking feature of the head is "weak" and does 
not license a head-external relation then only a "feature movement" chain can surface. In such 
a case a full categorial copy chain could not be expressed by the morphology. So this view 
dispenses with the strong/weak distinction in syntax and places it fully in the morphological 
component. Notice that it also eliminates the strong/weak distinction, in the sense of 
collapsing it with an independently necessary parameter which determines the number of 
specifiers (more precisely elements in the checking domain) of a given functional head. The 
analysis thus provides a case where the limitations of the interpretive, morpho-phonological 
component (word/head-external checking is not licensed) prevent the full expression of the 
perfect syntactic relation (copy of full lexical item) and force an imperfect instantiation (copy 
of features only, as these can be checked head-intemally).
I argued so far for the assumption that the interpretive components cannot directly 
influence the syntactic computation, although they can filter its output. In this respect the 
semantic/conceptual and the SPELLOUT component behave similarly. There is however also 
a conspicuous difference between them: syntactic elements are generally identical to elements 
to which the semantic/conceptual system needs to refer. Suppose that the discussion of the 
strong/weak distinction above is on the right track and "strength", ie. the licensing of the 
head-externality of checking relations is not visible syntax internally. Then little reason 
remains to assume that syntax ever needs to make use of elements or features that have only 
morpho-phonological but no semantic/conceptual interpretation. This leads directly to the 
second general constraint pertaining to the interaction of syntax with the interpretive 
components. The perfect (L)LF assembly system should be constructed using only elements 
that the semantic/conceptual interpretive system provides. This condition, which I shall refer 
to as radical interpretability, is natural, and I will give some indication below that it may be 
tenable empirically.
Radical interpretability is related to the condition that requires syntactic representations 
not to contain non-interpretable features (or features without "effect" on the interpretive 
components), —call this interpretability. But the requirement that all features must have either 
semantic or morpho-phonological content is not only weaker but also stronger in one respect 
than radical interpretability. In contrast to interpretability, radical interpretability requires all 
syntactic elements to be (semantically) interpretable, but not necessarily actually interpreted 
in a given structure. The latter requirement seems too strong. As just noted, in perfect syntax 
there can be no distinction between interface invisibility and invisibility for the computational 
system. But the stronger construal of radical interpretability would rule out even the concept 
of interface invisibility necessary for example for checking theory (cf. section 4 below): if 
a syntactic feature is invisible at the interface it would receive no interpretation.
Although there seems to be no difficulty in taking the existence of the copy relation 
as such not to be a departure from perfection, as noted earlier the minimalist framework 
assumes several a priory unexpected conditions on this relation, which clearly could not be 
part of the perfect assembly system. In what follows I will argue that those conditons on 
Chain/Move that do not dissolve on closer examination should be thought of as either 
constraints on the interpretive components or as bare output conditions. In the next section 
I shall start with the c-command and the cyclic properties of Move. After critically examining 
two approaches in the standard minimalist framework to eliminating these stipulations
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(sections 2.1 and 2.2), I shall turn to an improved analysis that is made possible by the 
assumptions of perfect syntax (section 2.3). Section 3 will discuss the MLC and section 4 
looks at checking theory.
2. Strong features, c-command and the cycle
2.1. Weak vs strong checking features
In earlier versions of the minimalist framework it was assumed that weak checking features 
have to be checked by a moved element by LF and strong features by PF. This ensured that 
both weak and strong checking features forced movement to occur and strong features 
furthermore forced movement to occur overtly. Chomsky 1995 makes somewhat different 
assumptions about strong features. He argues that strong features not only force overt 
movement, they also ensure the cyclicity of this operation. He suggests that strong features 
once Merged must be checked/eliminated "quickly" by Move or Merge. "Quickly" is defined 
essentially as in (1):
(1) The derivation terminates if an element H with a strong feature is in a category
not headed by H
(1) entails the cycle for overt movement. Movement targeting a position in a given 
phrase P (and checking a strong feature of its head H there) must now precede movement 
targeting a higher position outside P. This is because a P-external position will necessarily 
be in a phrase not headed by H. Hence the strong feature of H will have survived in a phrase 
not headed by H, contrary to (1). (1) also ensures a form of c-command (m-command) for 
overt movement between the moved category and its trace. In order to overtly move a to a 
position that is not in the minimal domain of a phrase that dominates a, to let a check a 
strong feature there, a structure must have been built which violates (1).
These appear to be welcome consequences: if possible we clearly do not wish to 
stipulate either c-command (which is only one of infinitely many possible structural relations) 
or the cyclic property for Move. This approach to the cycle and to c-command however does 
not seem promising for three reasons. First (1) appears to lack genuine independent 
motivation. Secondly its explanation, to be discussed below, is untenable and therefore (1) 
remains stipulative. Thirdly (1) would not be general enough. I shall take these points one 
by one, starting with the question of independent motivation. This involves mainly the 
question of strong features forcing overt movement.
Given the assumption that strong features cannot be inserted covertly, which Chomsky 
takes to be the consequence of wider considerations, (1) is taken to entail that strong features 
force overt movement, since the strong feature on a head H must be eliminated before the 
phrase H projected is merged with some other element. But covert movement will occur only 
after the whole structure has been assembled (after the SPELLOUT point). One problem here 
is that if H is the highest head in the tree then the theory predicts that its strong feature, 
introduced overtly, can be checked covertly. This is incorrect: a strong +wh feature on the 
root C for example cannot be satisfied by covert Move.
Notice that given Chomsky’s assumption that strong features can only be satisfied by 
categories (section 2.1, p ll) , the strong +wh feature on the root C would force movement 
of a category rather than a feature, whether it is satisfied overtly or covertly. The PF pied- 
piping theory of overt movement includes a least effort type assumption that entails that
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covert movement does not involve categories (section 4.4). But the least effort assumption is 
not strong enough to rule out category movement in this case since it requires nothing more 
than features to move, only when movement of nothing more is forced. But here movement 
of a category is forced by the strong feature under the assumption that strong features can 
only be satisfied by categories.
Note also that in any case the conjunction of the assumption that strong features can 
only be satisfied by categories with the PF pied piping theory creates a redudancy. The fact 
that overt movement must involve categories is now entailed by both, suggesting that at least 
one of the two ideas should be modified. Suppose we reject the PF pied piping theory (see 
Brody 1995b for arguments) and assume for the sake of argument that strong features must 
be satisfied by categories, whereas weak ones can also be satisfied by features. This should 
suffice then as a strong/weak distinction, there should be no need to duplicate this in terms 
of a derivational property of quick elimination of the feature. The distinction does suffice in 
a theory where (L)LF is the input to SPELLOUT, and therefore the question of invisible 
(covert) movement of categories does not arise. (For reasons not strictly relevant to the 
discussion of (1), and as noted in section 1 above, I assume a somewhat different theory of 
the strong/weak distinction, see also below in section 4.)
The direct empirical evidence for (1) is that it might allow adjuncts intervene between 
the two elements of the checking relation as eg. in (2). If adjunction does not close off a 
projection, then the strong feature of the inflectional head can be checked by the subject, still 
within the projection of this head. The dubious status of adjunction configurations in general 
(eg. Chomsky 1995, Brody 1994, 1995b), and in the particular case of adverbials (Cinque 
1995), weakens this point considerably. If such adjuncts are heads or specifiers, then the 
argument will not go through.
(2) John probably has left already
The result is quite questionable also on directly empirical grounds: many clear cases of 
checking configurations require adjacency that does not tolerate intervening adverbials, for 
example wh-checking in English or focus in Hungarian:
(3) a. Who (^suddenly) did Bill discover
b. Kit (*tegnap)latott Mari
Who+acc yesterday saw Mary
Let us next look at the question of whether (1) can be attributed to some more general 
consideration. In Chomsky 1995 it is claimed that (1) follows from (4), where (4) itself is 
claimed to be a consequence of other considerations.
(4) Nothing can join to a non-projecting category
"Non-projecting" here cannot mean a category C that is embedded in some phrase not headed 
by C. This is because in the standard minimalist framework under this interpretation (4) 
would exclude covert movement. So "non-projecting" in (4) must mean a category that does 
not project as a result of the joining operation, ie. (4) expresses an extension of the 
generalization that it is always the target of Move that projects (cf. Chomsky 1994, 1995, 
Brody 1995a,b for different approaches to this principle). But this reading is irrelevant since 
the requirement that the target projects does not entail (1). If Move lands in an embedded
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position, its target could still in principle project.
It appears that we must choose the first reading of (4) and in order to distinguish weak 
and strong features we need to restrict it to overt movement:
(5) Nothing can overtly join to a non-projecting category
But although (5) does not refer to feature strength, it is just as much a stipulation as (1). It 
is simply a statement of the overt cycle which (1) therefore failed to explain.
Let us turn to the third set of problems with the explanation of the cycle and the c- 
command property of Move in (1): even if the principle was otherwise tenable, it would not 
be general enough. (1) stipulates that overt movement is cyclic. How about Merge? As 
Chomsky notes "it applies at the root only". Embedded Merge would be more complex than 
at the root. "Any such complication (which could be quite serious) would require strong 
empirical motivation." (Ch4.3, p l 1). Of course this does not entail the extension requirement 
for Merge, the remark just explains why a theory that entails it would be desirable. (A 
problem for the standard minimalist theory is that the same consideration applies to any 
embedded operation, overt or covert. Thus it applies also to covert object shift which is 
allowed in the minimalist theory.)
Thus in the theory based on (1), the c-command property of Move and the cycle are 
ensured only partially, and by a conspiracy of stipulations. (1) entails the cyclicity of overt 
Move, the stipulation in (5) would entail the extension requirement for overt Merge, —further 
conditions will be necessary to rule out covert countercyclic Move and covert Move to non 
c-commanding positions. If overt embedded Merge is taken to be ruled out for the same 
reason as overt embedded Move (as in (5)), then still further stipulations are necessary to rule 
out covert embedded Merge.
Chomsky also appears to note that the explanation of cyclicity and c-command based 
on (1) is not a full solution. He observes that "it would be interesting to strengthen [the] 
conclusion: to show ...that overt targeting of an embedded category (hence lowering and 
non-cyclic raising) is not possible, hence a fortiori not necessary" (section 4.1. p. 16). But the 
remark seems to me to somewhat misstate the issue which does not have to do with the 
modality of the restriction but with its generality.
2.2. C-command by Merge
Crediting Kawashima and Kitahara (1994) and Eric Groat (p.c.) Chomsky briefly sketches 
a more general solution to the problems of cyclicity and c-command. This is based on the 
theory of Epstein (1994) where
(6) "C-command is just the relation that holds between a and elements of ß when
a is attached to ß by Merge or Move" (section 4.1, pl6)
Hence an embedded operation that attaches a to ß will establish no c-command relation 
between elements in the tree higher than ß and a. Given the further assumptions that all 
terminals must be ordered at PF and that terminals are ordered at PF only by c-command 
relations holding between them (or between categories dominating them) at LF (Kayne 1995), 
such embedded operations will be prohibited in the overt syntax. Thus overt Merge and Move 
must be cyclic. Similarly overt Move to a non c-commanding position, whether lowering or 
"sideways" (ie. where no c-command relation is established between a and its trace) is
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prohibited.
Again, there are a number of problems with this solution. First, the assumption that 
LF c-command determines PF precedence establishes an LF—PF link that might cause a PF 
crash. But this conflicts with what seems to be the optimal assumption, that within core 
grammar there are no such LF-PF interactions. (Cf: "We thus adopt the (non-obvious) 
hypothesis that there are no PF-LF interactions relevant to convergence..." (section 1, pi).)
Secondly, since traces need not be ordered at PF (cf Chomsky 1995, section 8), all 
improper overt operations will still be allowed as long as they are followed by cyclic raising. 
For example lowering (from P) followed by raising (to P’, not lower than P) is still allowed:
0 )  *tip John [yp 
P’
t believed [IP t to have arrived a man yesterday 
P
(8) *[ip Who [yp t wondered [ t +WH [ Mary left ]]]] 
P’ P
In (7) John lowered from its thematic VP-spec position into the non-thematic spec-IP position 
of the embedded clause. It cannot remain here since no c-command relation would hold 
between itself and, say, the matrix verb believe. If it subsequently cyclically moves to the 
matrix spec-IP, then no PF violation remains: John c-commands the rest of the sentence and 
its traces, invisible at PF need not be ordered. The same problem is raised by the "round trip" 
A’-movement derivation in (8). While one might think of various ways of ruling out such 
derivations, it is clear that the c-command and the cyclicity properties of overt Move do not 
follow fully from the approach under consideration.
There are further problems of coverage, echoing the shortcomings of the strong feature 
theory of cyclicity and c-command considered above. This theory allows countercyclic covert 
Move (like object shift) since covert operations do not feed PF, hence they need not establish 
a c-command based full ordering. But this means that the theory does not extend to any 
covert operation: countercyclic covert Merge, covert lowering and covert "sideways" Move 
will also be incorrectly allowed.
2.3 The cycle and c-command in perfect syntax
As a first step, observe that the problems with the solution based on c-command ordering can 
be largely remedied on the assumption that elements of LF rather than of PF representations 
are ordered by this relation. This assumption immediately eliminates the problem of linking 
LF and PF representations: no such link is necessary. Since traces are represented as visible 
copies at LF, the possibility of saving an illegitimate operation of Move which lands in a non 
c-commanding position or applies countercyclically by a later legitimate application 
disappears. The traces/copies also must be ordered at LF, hence the possibility of making an 
illegitimate operation avoid exclusion by turning the element in the landing position into an 
invisible trace ceases to exist. Furthermore, if all elements must be ordered by LF c- 
command then all Move and Merge operations (overt or covert) will now have to be cyclic 
and all applications of Move (overt or covert) will have to target a c-commanding position. 
Thus the problems relating to the covert applications of these rules disappear also.
A salient consequence of assuming Epstein’s definition of c-command and stating the 
ordering requirement of Kayne’s Linear Correspondence Axiom at LF is that there will be 
only a single cycle in the derivation of LF. This should not be problematic if covert Move
35
does not affect PF material. That "covert Move" relations do not affect the placement of the 
category and its phonology anywhere in syntax was argued in Brody 1993a, 1995a, see also 
Chomsky 1995, Brody 1995b. Of course the assumption makes it also unnecessary to 
consider the SPELLOUT point in the syntactic derivation to be different from LF.
The assembly system of Brody 1995a,b which satisfies the strictures of perfect syntax 
is not cyclic: the elements of the input list (a concept related to the notion of numeration) are 
joined simultaneously in one step. The cycle is incompatible with the requirement that the 
syntactic derivation create no intermediate structures between the input list and the interface 
level LF (Brody 1995a). But the question of how to ensure the cycle may be a pseudo-issue 
if the cycle in fact is unnecessary. Cyclic effects can be noticed only where the application 
of some constraint can be illegitimately avoided by a noncyclic derivation. But if the 
constraints in question in fact apply to or beyond the syntactic output representation (the 
expected case in perfect syntax, where they will be constraints on the interpretive components 
or bare output condition) then it will generally be impossible to avoid them through changing 
the derivational history.
A typical case is the late insertion of intervener type cycle violations for the minimal 
link condition (MLC). But if the MLC (or any other condition with the relevant effect) applies 
to the fully formed LF representation (cf. section 3 below), then the derivational history of 
the structure will be irrelevant: the effect of the MLC cannot be avoided at LF which 
necessarily contains the intervening elements. In (9) for example the the intervening subject 
jt will necessarily be present between John and its trace.
(9) *John seems it is certain t to go
(10) *Who were [pictures of t] bought [pictures of t]
Similarly, the subject island violation of (10) cannot be voided by first applying wh-movement 
and then passive if the presence of a subject-internal trace is determined on the basis of the 
output representation.
Thus no cycle should be necessary in perfect syntax given the general architecture of 
the theory, where constraints apply to the output of the assembly system. There will be then 
nothing to explain: the optimal case. The question of excluding lowering operations may 
similarly turn out to be pseudo-issue due to the minimalist duplication of the concept of Chain 
by Move. In perfect syntax lowering and raising cannot be distinguished: chains are neutral 
with respect to this dimension. Again the situation is optimal: the theory is designed in such 
a way that there is nothing to explain. (The question of hierarchical directionality does arise 
in the treatment of the Generalized Projection Principle, but this is demonstrably a matter for 
the interpretive component since this principle constrains also nonsyntactic features. Cf Brody 
1995a, b.)
All that remains then is the question of chains connecting positions that are not related 
by c-command. One possibility would be to exclude such chains by adopting a version of the 
Epsteinian solution to the assembly system of perfect syntax. We could require that there must 
be a syntactic relation at LF between the members of a given chain and assume that the only 
syntactic relation that exists is the one created by the operation of Insert (cf. Brody 1995a,b). 
Thus c-command is just the relation that holds between a and elements of ß on one hand and 
(irrelevantly for the present problem) the head of ß and elements of a (including a) on the 
other, when the operation Insert joins a and ß by making ß immediate dominate a. 
Alternatively, if ellipsis involves chains, as suggested by Chomsky 1995, then chains whose 
members are not in a c-command relation in fact exist. The question then shifts to
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differentiating ellipsis chains from others in terms of c-command, —presumably a problem in 
the interpretive component and not in the assembly system.
This raises a different though related issue of whether all relations involving c- 
command reduce to the chain relation or whether the interpretive component will need to refer 
additionally to c-command. I will not attempt here to go beyond noting the issue. The 
assumption that chain-members are not forced to be in a c-command relation by syntax 
assumes that the interpretive system has access to this relation. On the other hand the obvious 
counter-example of anaphora to the more restrictive hypothesis, according to which all c- 
command relations reduce to chain-relations can be fairly straightforwardly accomodated. 
Thus ordinary anaphors have been treated as involving a chain/move relation, while bound 
(variable) anaphora has been argued to require precedence rather than c-command (Williams 
1994, Brody 1994, see also Hornstein 1994 for a contrary view and some discussion below).
3. The Minimal Link Condition (MLC) and covert A’-chains
The MLC in Chomsky 1995 restricts elements moving to a given target K to the closest one 
among those that have the property that they can enter into a checking relation with K. This 
version of the MLC covers cases like superraising (lib), superiority (12b) and wh-island 
violations (13b).
(11) a. **It seems t(it) is certain John to meet Mary 
b.**John seems it is certain t(John) to meet Mary
(12) a. Who t(who) saw what
b. ?*What who saw t(what)
(13) a. *Who did you wonder [cp t(who) [IP t(who) gave this book to whom]] 
b. ?To whom did you wonder who gave this book t(to whom)
The MLC does not allow these derivations since in each case there is a nearer element to the 
target of movement that has appropriate checking features. In (lib ) this is the expletive 
subject it, in (12b) and (13b) the wh-phrase who in subject and spec-CP position respectively. 
The MLC would therefore allow the derivations in the a. examples in (11) through (13). Such 
a derivation happens to give a grammatical result in (12), but crashes in (11) and (13). 
Chomsky points out that under such a formulation of the MLC it could not be an economy 
condition: if crashing derivations could block a converging one then presumably no operation 
would ever take place. So he takes the MLC to be part of the definition of Move.
The restrictive assembly system of perfect syntax aims to avoid both economy 
conditions and stipulated conditions on chains/movement like the MLC. There are also 
empirical reasons for questioning the generalization the MLC expresses. Superraising, 
Superiority, Wh-island violations appear to very have different (un)grammaticality status, 
raising initial doubts about a principle that treats them uniformly. Judgements range from the 
completely hopeless superraising case through the intermediate superiority effects to the only 
mildly deviant and sometimes fully grammatical wh-island violations. As is well known, the 
wh-island cases improve probably to full grammaticality with infinitival complements as for 
example in (14). Since the MLC cannot be made sensitive to the presence of tense in any 
obvious way, it will rule out also such cases.
(14) Which crimes does the FBI know how to solve
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Another problem with the MLC is that it is not compatible with covert A’-movement: 
covert A’-movement of wh-in-situ and similar elements would regularly violate the MLC, as 
exemplified in (15) where the wh-in-situ should be understood with matrix scope.
(15) Who wondered who t bought what
Chomsky 1994, 1995 assumes that A’-movement can take place only in the overt derivation, 
but it is not clear why A- and A’-movement/chains should differ in this way. Furthermore the 
assumption makes some of the standard evidence for covert A’-movement/chains puzzling. 
In-situ neg-phrases are sensitive to complement non-complement divide as was first observed 
by Kayne 1981 (see also Jaeggli 1981, Rizzi 1982, Longobardi 1991 for the same effects in 
other Romance languages). This is parallel to overt A’- chains as exemplified in (16) and (17)
(16) a. Who did you say that Mary saw 
b.*Who did you say that saw Mary
(17) a. Jean n ’exige que Pierre voit personne
J not require that P has seen no one 
b *Jean n ’exige que Pierre soit arrete 
J not require that P be arrested
Or as argued first by Longobardi, the relation between the in situ neg-phrase and its scope 
(marked by non) shows subjacency effects:
(18) Complex NP Constraint
*Non approverei la tua proposta di vedere nessuno 
T would not approve of your proposal of seeing anybody’
(19) Sentential Subject Condition:
?*Chiamare nessuno sara possible 
’To call no one will be possible’
(20) Adjunct Condition:
a. *Non fa il suo dovere per aiutare nessuno 
’He does not do his duty in order to help anyone’
b. *Per ottenere nulla ha fatto il suo dovere
Tn order to obtain nothing has he done his duty’
As observed by Watanabe (1991) wh-in-situ in Japanese type languages also has properties 
that parallel those of overt movement/chains. (21) is an example, where the wh-in-situ within 
the wh-island creates a degraded grammaticality status:
(21) ??John-wa [Mary-ga nani-o katta [ka dooka]] Tom-ni
top nom what-acc bought whether dat 
tazuneta no 
asked Q
’What did John ask Tom whether Mary bought t?’
Hornstein (1994), who assumes the MLC and rejects covert A’-movement attepts to 
neutralize Longobardi’s examples by assuming that they involve A-movement. This does not
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appear to lead to an easily tenable position however for two reason. First as Longobardi made 
clear, the relation has typical A’-chain locality properties, in particular it can escape from 
embedded tensed clauses:
(22) Non approverei che tu gli consentissi di vedere nessuno 
’I would not approve that you allow him to see anybody’
Secondly, as (21) shows, covert wh-relations show similar effects. But wh-chains are 
prototypical A’-relations.
A more plausible theory that would neutralize the evidence of the examples in (18) 
through (21) would claim that all syntactic A’-movement is subject to the MLC and that 
syntactic A’-movement occurs only to satisfy some checking feature of a +wh/+Neg head. 
This point is neutral with respect to whether the movement of the in situ neg-phrase in (18) - 
(20) and the wh-phrase in (21) involves overt movement (of, say, an empty operator as in 
Watanabe 1991) or covertly (say, as movement of formal features, as in Chomsky 1995). The 
crucial distinction would be between in situ elements that need to move to satisfy some 
checking feature and in situ elements that do not have similar motivation to move. The two 
groups correspond to the primary and the secondary or parasitic wh/neg-chains respectively 
of Brody 1995a. The wh-in-situ not constrained by the MLC in (15) would belong to the 
group of secondary relations, while the in situ elements exhibiting movement characteristics 
in (18) through (21) would be primary ones. Could it be claimed then that only primary 
relations involve syntactic movement/chains, and hence only these show movement/chain 
characteristics including the MLC?
Such a claim would be incompatible with the checking theory to be discussed in 
section 4 below, in which no distinction can be made between primary and secondary chains 
with respect to their behavior in checking relations. There is also direct empirical evidence 
that appears to show that the claim that only primary relations involve syntactic 
movement/chains would not be correct: secondary relations also show island effects. Neg- 
phrases participating in secondary relations show parallel locality behaviour to parasitic gaps. 
As Kayne 1983 showed, although parasitic gaps can be separated from the primary gap by 
an island, within this island they show movement diagnostics with respect to further islands. 
As pointed out by Longobardi 1991, secondary neg-phrases appear to do likewise. This is 
exemplified in (23)-(24).
(23) Parasitic neg-phrases:
a. (In a Sentential Subject)
(?)Chiamare nessuno [secondary neg-phrase] servira a 
niente, ormai
’To call nobody will do any good now’
b. (In an Adjunct)
Non fa niente per aiutare nessuno [secondary neg-phrase]
’He does not do anything in order to help anyone’
(24) a. Adjunct island inside Subject island:
* Parti re per incontrare nessuno [secondary neg-phrase] 
servira a niente
’To leave in order to meet no one will do any good’ 
b.Adjunct island inside another:
*Non fa niente per scoprire la verita indagando su
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nessuno [secondary neg-phrase]
’He doesn’t do anything in order to discover the truth 
by investigating anyone’
In Brody 1995a I argued for extending the analysis in terms of parasitic chains to wh- 
relations. Chomsky 1986 drew the conclusion about parasitic gaps on the basis of such 
locality evidence that they must involve movement. If we draw the same conclusion here 
about secondary neg-and wh-relations, then the relation of the in-situ wh-phrase in (15) to its 
scope position must involve a chain/Move relation. The analysis creates difficulties then for 
the MLC, since in examples like (15) with matrix scope for the wh-in-situ, this condition will 
be violated.
Various further problems for the MLC arise from properties of superiority effects. 
These can be alleviated in several types of constructions including (25), where the wh-in-situ 
is associated with the matrix wh-phrase (cf. Lasnik and Saito 1992) and (26) where the wh- 
in-situ is d-linked (cf. Pesetsky 1987)
(25) Who wondered what who bought
(26) Which book did which girl buy
From the perspective of the MLC, such cases are difficult to understand and therefore they 
raise doubts about this condition. The alternative quasi-semantic treatment of superiority based 
on work by Chierchia (1991), put forward independently by Williams (1994) and Hornstein 
(1994), on the other hand is able to make sense of such apparent counterexamples.
The analysis, which relates the phenomenon to weak crossover, claims that a wh-in- 
situ is or contains an element whose interpretation is dependent on the A-position copy of the 
wh-phrase in spec-CP. Superiority violations arise when this dependency is illegitimate. For 
present purposes it does not matter if this is because the antecedent of the dependent element 
D must precede D (Williams 1994, Brody 1994) or because it must "almost c-command" 
(Hornstein 1994) D. Such an analysis captures the three way parallel between the crossover 
and the superiority violations in (28) and (29) and the lack of pair-list interpretation in (30) 
(cf. especially Hornstein 1994 for details and much additional argument):
(28) What did who buy (what)
(29) Who did his father meet (who)
(30) What did everyone say (what)
In none of the three cases does the trace of the wh-phrase in spec-CP c-command or precede 
the dependent element (who.his and everyone respectively). Furthermore in (25) the trace of 
the matrix wh-phrase does c-command and precede the wh-in-situ, thus the latter element can 
be associated with the matrix wh-phrase without incurring a superiority violation. (26) also 
becomes understandable on the assumption that a d-linked wh-phrase need not be a dependent 
element. (Notice that we cannot meaningfully make a similar exemption from the MLC for 
d-linked wh-phrases by allowing these to be crossed. The MLC is a formal no-crossing 
requirement not directly sensitive to the interpretive status of the elements involved.)
To summarize so far, the island behavior of neither overt nor covert A’-movement 
conforms to that predicted by the MLC. Furthermore the condition incorrectly predicts 
superiority violations in various cases and is incapable of capturing the similar behavior of 
weak crossover, pair-list reading and superiority constructions. Discounting superiority and
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wh-islands the major remaining effect of the MLC is the exclusion of superraising. Here again 
there are alternatives. One possibility might be to restrict theta role percolation in the spirit 
of Williams 1994. Brody 1995a,b argues for an interpretive mechanism of feature percolation 
in chains, that involves thematic roles alongside non-syntactic selectional features. Suppose 
that NP-traces can receive but cannot directly percolate (transmit) theta roles to higher chain 
members: they can do this only via the subject-predicate relation under a stricter locality 
condition. Let’s assume for concreteness that the theta role can be inherited from the NP-trace 
vertically by the smallest predicate VP that includes the trace, and which can in turn assign 
it to its subject via the predication relation. Vertical transmission is possible only from from 
(Caseless) NP-traces. This may be a subject trace as in raising or an object trace, as in 
passives and ergatives. This will allow successive cyclic chains but no superraising in English.
In (lib ) for example the theta role of the most deeply embedded verb, meet will be 
assigned to the VP-intemal NP-trace from which it will percolate to the predicate VP t meet 
Mary. This assigns the theta role to the subject, again a Caseless trace that allows further 
percolation to the next predicate. The subject of this predicate is the expletive it however, so 
this receives the theta role. No further percolation can take place and the matrix subject John 
will remain without a theta role. The acccount predicts also that superraising will be possible 
in multiple subject languages (Ura 1994) on the assumption that in these a predicate can 
sometimes enter multiple predications relations.
The MLC thus largely dissolves, as perfect syntax leads us to expect it would: most 
of the phenomena in its scope turns out to involve interpretive relations that should be 
constrained within the interpretive component. Dependency, in the sense used here in the 
account of superiority and related phenomena is clearly a semantic relation, and so is the 
mechanism of theta role percolation. This is just a particular case of percolation of selectional 
features, only a subset of which are syntactic, —cf. Brody 1995a,b.
Numerous questions remain in the area of locality phenomena, which a fuller treatment 
would need to address. Let us look at one case that might appear related to the MLC: the 
well-known wh-island effect that shows up even in constructions like (14). This is the so 
called scope reconstruction, —in fact a dependent reading of the wh-phrase on a quantifier c- 
commanding its trace. This reading does not obtain even in otherwise grammatical wh-islands 
(on "scope reconstruction" cf. e.g. Longobardi 1984, Rizzi 1990, Williams 1994, Hornstein 
1994). Thus (31a) can be construed as a question asking about each individual which book 
that individual read, where they all potentially read different books. Such a construal is 
possible also where the quantifier is in an embedded clause as in (31b). (31c) on the other 
hand only has a reading "which book is such that you wondered whether everyone read that 
book", ie. on which everyone read the same book. Similar judgement obtains with the 
infinitival embedded clause in (3Id).
(31) a. Which book did everyone read
b. Which book did you believe everyone to have read
c. Which book did you wonder whether everyone read
d. Which book did you wonder whether to believe everyone to have read
Hornstein proposes that the MLC is responsible for this difference: it always prevents 
extraction from the wh-island. (14) will then involve an island internal empty operator 
movement (cf. Cinque 1990) construed with the matrix wh-phrase. Dependent reading of the 
wh-phrase will be impossible since the MLC effectively prevents "reconstruction" of the wh-
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phrase into the island: the trace in the island will be the trace/copy of the empty operator and 
not that of the wh-phrase. This account raises numerous questions. First of all, if our 
discussion so far is correct, the standard minimalist version of the MLC has little independent 
motivation, hence invoking it here would be quite stipuladve. Other problems have to do with 
the empty operator: what is its landing site, what checking relation triggers its movement 
(there are no plausible candidates), etc? Yet others have to do with the scope of the 
phenomena. Since the effect shows up in other types of islands, Hornstein suggests 
assimilating all relevant island violations to wh-islands. If all islands have a filled A’-spec 
then crossing these will be ruled out by the MLC (note 26, p. 181). This would make it 
necessary to postulate a filled A’-spec (in addition to postulating a head that is necessary to 
check the empty operator) also in complex NP constructions and adjuncts where the same 
effect obtains. The marginal structures in (32) cannot have the "scope reconstruction" reading 
either.
(32) a. ??Which book did you deny the fact that everyone read
b. ??'Which book did you meet Mary before everyone read
But there is no evidence for any of the three empty elements that this account needs 
to postulate (empty blocking A’-spec, empty Operator, empty head to check the empty 
Operator). Thus given minimalist assumptions, it is quite unlikely that that the MLC is 
responsible for "scope reconstructions" effects. (This is not to say that it is inconceivable that 
some notion of crossing is at issue in the examples in (31), although (32) raises some doubts 
even about this much weaker claim. In the context of Rizzi’s (1990) relativized minimality 
it was reasonable to put examples like $15. aside as due to some other notion of barrier, since 
relativized minimality captured a rich generalization in that it constrained also the behavior 
of adjuncts. But this is not true of the MLC. One important respect in which the MLC differs 
from relativized minimality is that it is taken to refer to argument-type elements. Thus if it 
was taken to constrain also adjuncts, it would predict the same type of violation: correctly or 
not, it cannot capture the adjunct argument asymmetry with respect to extraction from 
islands.)
4. Checking theory 
4.1. Bare cheking theory
Let us start with subject verb agreement. The checking theory of Chomsky 1993 assumes that 
in addition to agreement features appearing on the verb and the subject, mediating features 
occur on the agreement node. In ""John hits Bill" ...The ^-features appear in three positions 
in the course of the derivation: internal to John, internal to hits, and in AGRS". In effect 
the mediating features are present in duplicate: "AGR must in fact have two kinds of 
features: V-features that check V adjoined to AGR and NP-features that check NP in SPEC- 
AGR." The mediating features delete when checked, so "at PF and LF the ^-features appear 
only twice, not three times: in the Noun Phrase and verb that agree." (p.42)
In Brody 1995c I argued against such mediating features. The major objection against 
NP- and V-features was that at LF the ^-features of subject/object-verb agreement should 
only occur on the subject, they do not appear to have a consistent additional interpretive 
function on the verb. Additional copies of checking features would presumably be excluded 
by the principle FI. But under a checking theory where Agr has separate V- and NP-features,
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there will still be two copies of the relevant features at LF after the mediating features have 
deleted. One of these will be on the subject and the other on the verbal head.
Such considerations led to a theory without splitting of Agr features: The approach, 
which I called "bare checking theory", takes seriously one of the original intuitions behind 
checking theory. It claims that "movement" or rather non-trivial chain formation is forced by 
bare output conditions at the LF interface. Chains are formed because of the way information 
is stored in the lexicon. The lexical items in a sentence duplicate certain features -the 
checking features— these duplications must disappear by LF through checking. Checking is 
thus forced by the fact that the features involved are interpretively redundant and would 
violate the principle of full interpretation. (We may assume that checking involves marking 
the redundant features invisible, perhaps as a result of merger of features in some sense. 
Merger might make both checking features invisible creating a single visible LF unit.)
Given bare checking theory, checking must take place because multiple instances of 
what is in fact one feature are not tolerated at the interface. It is not necessary then to invoke 
non-interpretability of features to force a checking configuration. Bare checking theory is thus 
consistent with radical interpretability according to which all features have semantic content.
Dispensing with NP- and V-features leaves the further question of whether mediating 
features (now without the split into NP- and V- features) exist. The basic assumption of bare 
checking theory does not require the elimination of the mediating features in Agr, although 
it would not disallow this move either. This theory is not compatible with the splitting of the 
features of Agr into NP- and V-features since this would result in two copies of ^-features 
at LF. But if 0-features are present in three position, then bare checking theory will simply 
require all three positions to merge by LF through checking.
Nevertheless I will assume that mediating features do not exist. Apart from simplicity 
considerations, an argument against these in Brody 1995c was that the evidence for the third 
copy of 0-features is missing even where it could be expected to occur. When the feature on 
Agr is weak we would expect it to show up at PF. It is only by stipulation (namely that 
unchecked weak features are invisible or delete in the PF component) that this incorrect 
prediction is neutralized. I assumed therefore that within bare checking theory subject verb 
agreement involves only a single checking relation: the 0-features of the verb and the subject 
are checked directly against each other. (On the assumption that checking must involve spec- 
head configurations in functional phrases, this will entail the formation of NP- and V-chains.)
Chomsky 1995 also develops a theory that is not compatible with the existence of 
mediating features. He proposes to eliminate the Agr node altogether. Although he does not 
discuss the matter, eliminating Agr could give the result we seek: after subject verb checking 
there will be only a single set of 0-features present at LF. Chomsky rejects the Agr node for 
reasons that are not dissimilar to those given in Brody 1995c for rejecting mediating features. 
Apart from simplicity (section 4.1 ppl6-17), Chomsky notes that unlike other functional 
categories like C, T or D for example, Agr does not contain interpretable (either LF or PF) 
features (section 10). "We therefore have fairly direct evidence from interface relations about 
T, C and D but not AGR" (p.8).
Notice though, two differences. First the argument from PF invisibility does not 
distinguish between (semantically/conceptually) interpretable and non-interpretable features: 
it argues against triplications irrespective of this dimension. Chomsky’s argument on the other 
hand is relevant only for features that have no interpretation at either interface.
Secondly, my argument questioned only the existence of mediating features while 
Chomsky argues against the Agr node itself. But the question of whether the Agr node exists 
is in fact composed of two issues: only one of which is the question of the mediating features.
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Even if these do not exist, it might be that some node a above T projects a phrase which 
hosts both a member of the subject chain (in its spec) and a member of the verbal head chain 
that enter into a checking relation here. One possibility is that T or perhaps all categories 
have the option of projecting recursively: a would then correspond to the higher T node. 
Thus we could retain the spec and the head positions as appears to be empirically desirable, 
without assuming the existence of mediating ^-features. The condition of interpretability (cf. 
section 1.2 above) could be satisfied jointly by the the two T nodes. (Similarly, recursively 
projecting Vs may be a way of creating multi-layered VPs.)
Consider next English interrogatives.
(33) I wonder (what) who +WH [(who) saw what]
(34) a. I wonder who +WH Bill saw (who)
b. Bill saw who
(35) Who did TWHMary (did) see (who)
(36) Did +WH John see Mary
In (33) there are three instances of the wh-feature (two on the wh-phrases and one on the 
embedded C node). But there is only one question. So by full interpretation the wh-features 
must all merge. This is possible if both wh-phrases form a chain that has a member that 
forms a checking relation with the +wh head. Thus bare checking theory entails the existence 
of A’-chains that express "covert A’-movement" relations, in accordance with our earlier 
conclusions. As noted in section 1, a chain corresponding to an "overt movement" relation 
is the default case, it will occur if the relevant head (here the +wh C) is "strong" enough to 
license a head-external element in the checking domain in the morphological component; —in 
the case of an XP-chain word-externally as a specifier. (On the reasons for "extended 
structure preservation" that prevents word-internal phrases see Brody 1995b).) Given the 
generalization that SPELLOUT operates only on the highest copy in a chain, the lexical item 
will show up in spec-CP. In English this head licenses a single spec, hence additional wh- 
phrases checked by it must remain in situ forming feature-chains only.
(34b) will be possible only with a -wh C and an echo interpretation. If it had a +wh 
C then the two wh-features in the structure should merge through checking by full 
interpretation. This makes a chain necessary, linking the wh-phrase to the checking domain 
of the +wh C. Since this head licenses an overt specifier in morphology, the chain must be 
a full copy chain as in (34a).
In (35) the auxiliary djd must have a wh-feature. We can analyze (35) in two ways. 
The choice between these depends on whether interpretable features on heads mediating spec- 
head relations between other elements can exist. If they do, then both C and T can have a wh- 
feature and T (together with the auxiliary) forms a chain because these must merge through 
checking. Additionally the wh-feature on who must also merge with this complex, hence an 
XP-chain is also formed. These will be chains involving copies of full categories since the 
relevant C licenses both a word-internal and a word-external element in its checking domain. 
Alternatively if mediating features are dispensed with, then the T with the wh-feature and the 
wh-phrase both form a chain linking them to CP because this is the the only way that they 
can establish a checking relation. (This latter alternative corresponds essentially to the account 
in Rizzi 1991, see also Brody 1990, 1995c.)
If yes-no questions contain an empty (wh-)operator in spec-CP then the analysis of 
(36) will not significantly differ from that of (35). If not, then (36) will be parallel to (34),
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modulo the difference between an X°-chain and an XP-chain.
Notice that we must apparently allow merger of a set of checking features without all 
of these occupying positions in the same checking domain. In (36) there are three instances 
of the -l-plural feature, but only one plurality: that of the DP. The +plural feature XP-chain 
of they apparently merges with the other two in two distinct spec’s. Given the independently 
necessary assumption that checking features are properties of the chains rather of the members 
of the chain (cf. Brody 1995b), this should create no problems. At LF there is only a single 
+ plural feature in (37), that of the chain.
(37) They (pi) seem (pi) clever (pi)
4.2 The minimalist checking theory and the + /-Interpretable distinction
Let us next consider briefly the current version of checking theory in the minimalist 
framework (Chomsky 1995). He suggests that interpretable features like categorial features 
and </>-features on nouns do not need to be checked, whereas noninterpretable features like for 
example Case or ^-features on verbal heads or "strength" (presumably a feature) of an 
interpretable feature must be checked because this makes it possible to eliminate these, as 
required by full interpretation. In fact he assumes further that once checked, these features 
are not visible for the remaining syntactic computation either.) Thus checking relations and 
indirectly movement and chain relations are forced by noninterpretable features. These must 
be eliminated, and they can be eliminated only when already checked.
The principle of radical interpretability is incompatible however with existence of 
noninterpretable features: according to this principle all syntactic features must be potentially 
interpretable. As we have seen, under bare checking theory it is not necessary to make use 
of noninterpretable features: checking relations are forced by the duplication of interpretable 
features. Furthermore the checking theory based on this distinction seems to lead to less 
optimal analyses. Consider for example the analysis of interrogatives within this theory.
The wh-feature is clearly interpretable hence not in need of being checked. A +wh 
feature will be checked only if it is "strong" and then overtly (some of the problems with the 
notion of strength used here were discussed in section 2 above). Thus in English the wh- 
feature on C is strong and hence it can be checked either by (T+)did as in (36) or by a wh- 
phrase as in (34). Since a strong feature can be satisfied by a single element, the analysis 
raises the question of why (38a) is unacceptable. Here the strong wh-feature of C is satisfied 
by the hosted verbal element.
(38) a. did John give which book to Mary
b. +WH John gave which book to Mary
Chomsky suggests that (38a) "converges as gibberish". (Notice that this contrasts with (38b), 
which crashes since the strong wh-feature on C has not been checked.) But since Chomsky 
rejects covert A’-movement type syntactic relations, he needs to assume the existence of some 
interpretive mechanism to link in situ wh-phrases to their scope. It is then unclear why (38a) 
is gibberish, why it cannot be interpreted with the interpretive strategy generally used for in- 
situ wh-phrases. As we have seen, under bare checking theory, where all wh-features must 
merge the problem does not arise: which book in (38a) must form a chain linking it to the 
wh-feature of the auxiliary (and perhaps also of C). Further, the chain must be a full category
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copy chain, that is one that corresponds to overt movement of the minimalist framework, 
since English C is strong, ie. it licenses a specifier in addition to an element in the word (X0)- 
internal checking domain.
(Further elaboration, like for example multiple strong features are necessary to 
generate (35) within Chomsky’s system of assumptions. Note that (35) like many other 
examples will violate also the MLC of the minimalist system: the wh-phrase moves to CP 
even though another element that could (and does) legitimately move there, namely the verbal 
complex, is nearer.)
The remaining prediction in the theory where noninterpretable features are crucially 
involved is the exclusion of movement from Case positions. On the assumption that Case is 
noninterpretable and that such features once checked are invisible for further computation, 
the derivation of (39) will crash. The Case feature of the DP John are checked and deleted 
in the embedded clause (together with the Case feature of the embedded T. Hence the 
noninterpretable Case feature on the matrix T cannot be checked and deleted when DP raises, 
and therefore the derivation will crash at LF.
(39) a.*John seems [t saw Mary]
b.*There seems [a man was clever]
If this is the only case where noninterpretable features are needed then the explanation 
is less appealing. Additionally easy-to-please and grammatical superraising suggest that Case 
is not relevant here:
(40) John is easy Op to please t
(41) John seems [ f  Mary liked t]
If the analysis in Brody 1993b is correct then in (40) we have a chain [John, Op, t] that 
involves two Case positions. Similarly in the grammatical superraising cases like (41) the 
superraising chain [John,t’,t] appears to involve two Case positions (Ura 1994). Notice that 
if John in (41) is taken not to check (accusative) Case in the position of t, then John in (39a) 
(and "a man" in (39b)) should similarly be able to avoid Case-checking in the lower clause. 
This would however eliminate the explanation of the ungrammatically of (39): these DPs 
could check the Case feature of the matrix T and the derivation would converge. (Ura 
suggests that in the grammatical superraising constructions lack of Case assignment to the 
trace correlates with the possibility of filling the position with a pro element. This 
generalization would still incorrectly allow (39) in subject pro drop languages like Italian or 
Hungarian.)
I will not attempt an alternative explanation of (39) here beyond noting that the 
contrast between (39) and (40)/(41) suggest that the subject non-subject difference may be 
relevant.
5. Conclusion, Uniformity, Last Resort, Procrastinate
Although various issues remain, the results so far seem encouraging. Stipulative conditions 
of the minimalist framework on the Move/chain relation, like the cycle/c-command, and the 
MLC appear unnecessary or attributable to the interpretive components as perfect syntax leads 
us to expect. Checking relations and indirectly (non-trivial) chain formation is forced by bare
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output conditions. Given bare checking theory this need not involve non interpretable features 
that would violate radical interpretability. I have discussed in detail and rejected the remaining 
major stipulative condition on Move/chain, namely Uniformity, in Brody 1995b. I argued 
there that a well-designed theory should not make available devices that would make it 
possible to violate the condition, which requires that all chain members be of the same 
projection level. If projectional levels are not defined relationally, then the question of 
uniformity cannot even arise. Since chains are sets of copies the chain members necessarily 
share also the projection level property.
Let me comment finally briefly and incompletely on two more conditions: Last resort 
and Procrastinate. Last resort can be thought of as an interface condition on the assumption 
that all categories must be licensed by full interpretation. This licensing involves participation 
in either (a) a projectional relation (selectional/ modificational relation or categorial 
projection) or (b) in a checking relation. Since by the generalized projection principle 
projectional relations are relevant only for chain roots (cf. Brody 1995b), non-roots of non­
trivial chains (i.e."Move" of the minimalist framework) can be licensed only by a checking 
relation.
I assumed that in the default case chains are formed on full categorial copies, feature 
chains occur only when full copies are not licensed in the checking domain of some head. 
This preference for "overt movement" type relations is consistent with the Transparency 
principle of Brody 1995a and incompatible with Procrastinate which would require feature 
chains as the default case. There were essentially two main reasons for rejecting 
Procrastinate. First it has difficulties with a configuration where there is multiple overt 
movement of a given type of element to some head. For example in a language where all wh- 
phrases must "overtly move", a strong +wh head appears to be accidentally satisfied by 
exactly as many wh-phrases as there are in the sentence. This seems to be a serious problem 
that is avoided by a preference for "overt movement", that is for chains that involve full 
copies of categories. Secondly Procrastinate (in present terms preference for feature- 
movement) predicts that in the default case LF and PF will be maximally different, and 
wherever they are similar, this is only due to morphological accidents (presence of a strong 
feature). This again appears to be a rather strange consequence that a preference for full 
copies avoids: now categories at LF and at PF will have similar distribution in the default 
case, it is when they do not, that we have the morphological accident. As we have seen this 
arises due to the limited expressive power of this component: a head may not always be able 
to check elements external to it.
There is a particular prediction of Procrastinate that our account so far has nothing to 
say about. The ungrammaticality of the examples in (42) has been attributed to this principle. 
Procrastinate will predict this, if at the embedded subject position it prefers insertion (of the 
expletive it, there), over the raising the associate (a man). Instead of the ungrammatical (42), 
we will then derive the grammatical (43).
(42) a. *There seems a man to have arrived
b. *It was believed a man to have been here
(43) a. There seems (there)to have arrived a man
b. It was believed (it) to have been a man here
Let us consider the alternative of claiming that the embedded subject position simply does not 
exist. If so it cannot be occupied by the associate and (42) cannot arise. This entails 
immediately that English object shift must be overt: him in (44) cannot be in the embedded
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subject position. (For independent arguments for the overtness of English object shift see eg. 
Johnson 1991, Koizumi 1993, Lasnik 1994.)
(44) John believed him to be clever.
The claim that the governed and Caseless subject positions of Government Binding theory 
do not exist, appears to entail also giving up the successive cyclicity of A-chains since 
intermediate A-chain links occupy such subject positions. But it is possible to construct direct 
evidence for A-chains being successive cyclic, -the intermediate traces in (45a) and (46a) act 
as interveners for the binding relations indicated. (The principle C violation in the b. 
examples shows that c-command holds between the relevant elements.)
(45) a. John seems to Maryx [ (John) to appear to herx//*herself [ (John) to have
met me ]]
b. *John seems to herx [ (John) to appear to Maryx [ (John) to have met me ]]
(46) a.John seems to Maryx [(John) to be considered [(John)clever by herx//herself]]
b. *John seems to herx [ (John) to be considered [ (John) clever by MaryJ]
If the full subject positions are not licensed, then the discussion so far leads to the hypothesis 
that intermediate traces in A-chains involve only feature copies. The feature copies on the 
checking head (presumably T) can act as interveners for the binding theory. If this idea can 
be elaborated into a tenable analysis, it would represent a case where a full copy is higher 
than a feature copy. This would be an impossible scenario in the minimalist theory: a "covert 
movement" type relation cannot be followed by an "overt movement" relation. (This is not 
to say of course that the configuration is not achievable through stipulation, say by deleting 
the intermediate trace but leaving its relevant features on the checking head.)
On the other hand given the assembly system of Brody 1995a,b, such a configuration 
would be expected to occur. Here copies (of features or of full categories and their content) 
can be freely made. (Full category copies are preferred as discussed in section 1 above.) 
Unless further constraints prevent this, feature copies and full copies can be inserted in the 
structure in any c-command order. In particular the original may be higher than several 
feature copies (which in turn may be higher then another full copy) as appears to be required 
for the analysis of successive cyclic A-movement, given the evidence in (45) and (46).
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